Talk:Single transferable vote/Archive 4

This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page.

Could anyone explain what is meant by "unspoilt votes"? Or what would be spoilt votes? Martinwilke1980 18:04, 25 August 2006 (UTC)

A spoilt vote is an invalid one (perhaps deliberately so). So not voting for anyone, or doing something else so that made the vote not be counted. --Henrygb 21:14, 25 August 2006 (UTC)

Technically, I think it should say "spoilt ballots", rather than "votes", but I could be wrong. Mdotley 21:14, 14 September 2006 (UTC)

Spoint Ballots and Voters are slightly different. I am taking an A level in Government and Politics, and we have been told that a voter can spoil his or her ballot paper (a spoilt ballot), for instance by marking the box with a tick rather than a cross (if that is what should be marked), however the vote may be counted (if the candidates all agree) - as it is clear who the voter wanted to win. Therefore it is a spoilt ballot but not a spoilt vote, and spoilt votes are what we are referring to in this context. Woodgreener 21:18, 6 January 2007 (UTC)

It is not up to the candidates; it is up to the rules as interpreted by the returning officer and possibly the election court (i.e. after a petition by a candidate). In UK elections where crosses are required, a a ballot paper with a tick instead of a cross would not count as a spoilt ballot for that reason. --Henrygb 00:02, 7 January 2007 (UTC)

I was an observer at an election count for Wicklow, in Ireland, during the 19 70's Three members to be returned. The process for dealing with ballot papers that had not been filed in exactly as specified by the rules, that is arabic numerals, 1, 2, 3 and so forth was they were picked out as "doubtful ballots" and then examined by an official called the "adjudicator." He was legally qualified, In this case a Barrister of the Kings Inns, Dublin. He invited representatives of the candidates (and me) to witness the adjudication process which consisted of him looking at each paper in turn and either deciding whether or not the INTENTION was clear or ruling the ballot spoiled. On each case he listened to the views of the candidates representatives, having made clear it was his decision alone, in the end, and that his decision was not final but could be disputed in the courts. (He asked me to give my opinion also on each paper). In practice the decision in each case was clear and in fact agreed by everyone. So for example, ballot papers showing a single "X" were regarded as showing a first preference only. Ballot papers with a single tick were also accepted as a single preference only. Amid some amusement the ballot paper where all the candidates had a preference indicated against them, but shown in ROMAN numerals was accepted as valid. I realise this comment counts as "original research" but I hope you find it helpful, and that being on the talk page and not the article, makes that ok (ish) Daithidebarra (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 16:23, 15 May 2015 (UTC)

The surplus needs definition. I've been following today's Irish election count and came here to understand the system. The article fails to make it clear how the surplus is calculated and apportioned. If the surplus is shared in proportion to all the second preference votes, how come there are no fractional votes in second and subsequent counts? I think I understand it, but that's from working through the example, definitely not from the description given. Bazj (talk) 19:53, 26 February 2011 (UTC)

I agree with your point, but the problem is that (as the article says) "There are variations in applying these STV rules, such as in how to transfer surplus votes from winning candidates and whether to transfer votes to already elected candidates."

From personal experience, the most proportional system is to transfer a fractional vote once a winning candidate has been elected with each vote having the value [(Total Votes - Quota)/ Total Votes], but I don't have a ref for that. When I was at Edinburgh University, however, they used a system for student elections in which the full value was transferred - no fractions at all. I'm not sure how to handle the different examples. --rpeh •T•C•E• 20:30, 26 February 2011 (UTC)

The difference is not that difficult to understand if you have witnessed an election count.

Assume the simplest case, someone has just been elected on the first stage (or count) well over the quota, and so with a comfortable surplus. So the candidate has a big pile of votes, all first preferences for them. All of the value "one vote" Calculate the size of the surplus - subtract quota from total. This will be a whole number of votes. Take the votes and sort them for their second preferences. That means you have a series of piles, or parcels of votes, each consisting of the second preferences for a particular candidate. Count the totals of second preferences. Then transfer the surplus by EITHER

FRACTIONAL METHOD

Divide the size of the surplus by the total vote for the candidate. Do this to whatever number of decimal places is specified. In Northern Ireland its done to two places, for Irish republic Seanad Elections to Panel seats its done to three decimal places. This gives you the new values for each paper. Now transfer the papers to the candidates and total up.

WHOLE METHOD

Work out how may votes are going to be transferred to each candidate. So say surplus a 1000 votes and half the second preferences for the candidate go to someone else then that someone else gets, 500 votes. Pick 500 papers out of the bundle of second preferences for that candidate and physically transfer.

This is inferior to the fractional method, but easier to do when counting manually. It is the system in use for elections to the Dail. Theoretically inferior, in practice it works.

So how does that info get into wikipedia?

Daithidebarra (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 16:44, 15 May 2015 (UTC)

In the article on STV it states that the original concept was not used in a "real election" until introduced in 1855 by Carl Andrae, a Danish politician.

Yet in another Wikipedia article on Thomas Wright Hill, it states that STV was used in an election in Adelaide, South Australia in 1840. Presumably this qualifies as a "real election". If so, there would appear to be some confusion over when STV was first used in a public election.

Here is the exact quotation from the article on Thomas Wright Hill.

"Thomas Wright Hill (24 April 1763 in Kidderminster – 13 June 1851 in Tottenham) was a mathematician and schoolmaster. He is credited as inventing the single transferable vote in 1819. His son, Rowland Hill, famous as the originator of the modern postal system, introduced STV in 1840 into the world's first public election, for the Adelaide City Council, in which the principle of proportional representation was applied."

Romper Levis (talk) 10:15, 10 August 2015 (UTC)

As far as I know, Carl Andrae and Thomas Hare were the first ones who proposed a form of the single transferable vote that could be used for secret ballots. Older forms of the single transferable vote presumed open voting. Markus Schulze 07:28, 13 August 2015 (UTC)

I put a POV tag on this article because it reads like an advocate's brief. It includes criticism of the system only by way of showing that all criticisms have been answered. To judge by this article, there is no good reason why any sensible people shouldn't adopt STV, yet it has been rejected (or, at least, not adopted) by democratic polities the world over. Are we to surmise that only entrenched interest prevents the universal adoption of STV? That's the logical conclusion to be drawn from this article, yet the article doesn't say it, which makes me suspect that the facts wouldn't support such an argument. Surely there are some intelligent arguments against STV that have not been handily disposed of? Let's have an article that reflects the actual state of debate on this issue. J. D. Crutchfield | Talk 19:34, 4 March 2015 (UTC)

Hope you don't mind my answering here. You are probably right that this article has been written mainly by people who think STV is in its way the best of all possible voting systems. So obviously it should have its shortcomings described clearly. But in the opposite direction I think it's lacklustre in its advocacy of STV: the case for STV could be argued more clearly. The trouble is that that would involve a pretty major rewrite, and I'd be grateful for guidance as to how one goes about that - is there a way of posting a draft rewrite for comment rather than taking the drastic step of just substituting it for the present article?

On your comment about the limited adoption of STV, I'd say yes, it is largely vested interests that prevent it: reform of voting systems normally comes up against huge inertia, because those in power are obviously those who do well under the existing system. As example, STV came near to being adopted in the UK during a period (roughly 1914 to 1930) of political upheaval when Labour was replacing the Liberal party; once politics had settled back to the 2-party system that FPTP encourages, those two parties prevented further consideration of alternative voting systems for 50 years. Dmollison (talk) 16:03, 28 March 2015 (UTC)

Dmollison: There is a "namespace" for drafts (WP:DRAFTS) as an alternative to the sandbox. One place to put questions is at the Teahouse WP:Teahouse - if you search the questions page there (WP:Teahouse/Questions) for "draft" you will find others with similar problems. To encourage comments on your draft take a look at WP:CANVASS. The alternative approach is WP:BOLD which is what I have done in the past. The article certainly is in need of a re-write. --BalCoder (talk) 08:27, 2 April 2015 (UTC)

Jdcrutch: You dispute the neutrality of the article although you seem to be unfamiliar with "the actual state of debate". You may feel that there must be arguments (intelligent or not) against STV ("Surely there are...") but if you can't identify one I am surprised you feel able to make such a bold edit. When you say the article shows "that all criticisms have been answered" perhaps you could give us an example of what you are talking about. Concerning casual vacancies, for example, the article simply lists various ways the problem has been handled. What do you expect? Unless you can justify your claim of bias you should remove the POV box. --BalCoder (talk) 08:27, 2 April 2015 (UTC)

@BalCoder: I come to the article as one more-or-less unfamiliar with the topic, seeking a balanced exposition of it. That's how I presume most readers come to any Wikipedia article. What I get instead is a description of a perfect system, with which nobody who has it seems to be dissatisfied, yet which most of the world has nevertheless failed to adopt. Every other voting system has pros and cons, but the only thing wrong with this one, as far as the article is concerned, is that voters may not be smart enough to recognize its superiority. ("A frequent concern is its complexity compared with plurality voting methods.") But even that quibble has been disposed of, thanks to computers. The article has clearly been written by true believers, and I don't need to know the skeptics' counter-arguments to see that and object to it.J. D. Crutchfield | Talk 14:03, 2 April 2015 (UTC)

Hyperbole. Noting that computers faciltate counting can hardly be described as partial. The article mostly just describes what STV is and how it works. None of the cons listed by the Electoral Reform Society is discussed but neither are any of the pros ("wasted votes" is at least mentioned). The article is not at all biased, it just needs drastically improving. Instead of a POV box a "multiple issues" one such as at the top of the Counting single transferable votes page would be more useful. I don't understand what WP:DRIVEBYTAGGING is but I suspect this is it. --BalCoder (talk) 17:42, 7 April 2015 (UTC)

Name-calling. The article Wikipedia:Tagging pages for problems, which is where the shortcut WP:DRIVEBYTAGGING leads, makes it quite clear (to anybody who bothers to read it) what drive-by tagging is, and how it can be avoided. It says,

When it comes to confusing or ambiguous tags, such as {{npov}} or {{dead end}}, you should explain yourself on the talk page and/or in an edit summary.

I did exactly what the article suggests, and more: I have returned several times to defend my action in good faith. If the scholarship is truly unanimous in favor of STV, as the present article would seem to suggest, then there should at least be reliable, impartial sources saying so. I rather suspect that there is a continuing debate, which somebody has probably summarized in a reliable secondary source. Citations to such an article might add the balance needed, and justify the removal of the POV tag. If an opponent won't step up to edit the article, even an advocate of STV, if she or he is frank and well-informed, should be able to supply the proper balance, because he or she will have considered the arguments for and against, each in the best possible light, and chosen between them. Meanwhile, the POV tag leaves the article unaltered, but stands as a warning to readers who might not otherwise read with the necessary skepticism. J. D. Crutchfield | Talk 18:54, 7 April 2015 (UTC)

Seems to me that some of the main issues with STV (monotonicity, transparency, proportionality, forming working majorities, "nursing the constituency", etc) are for the most part well-sourced and already mentioned in the "Issues" section; however they are buried within a mountain of info that attempts to refute each problem. IMO the article is not so much biased, as it is confusingly written. It might be appropriate to rename this section "Effects," and rewrite the section to make it much more cut-and-dry. I think that would be a better solution than having "Advocacy" and "Issues" sections. We could do like First-past-the-post voting and have an Effects section AND a Criticism section, but that doesn't seem quite right to me either. There is certainly enough research on STV to make this article look just like that (also C-class rated) one. <> Alt lys er svunnet hen (talk) 02:16, 5 May 2015 (UTC)

Here's a couple sources I found on the issues btw... ^{[1] [2]} <> Alt lys er svunnet hen (talk) 02:20, 5 May 2015 (UTC)

Monotonicity is the primary issue with STV, due to the fact that with enough candidates, and with candidates with very strong second-or-third order choices, the order of elimination becomes important, and as the number of candidates and availability of information about voting preferences increases, the chance of running into a monotonicity violation increases. It's simple to vote, complex to tally, like most preferential or evaluative systems, which isn't really a problem, more a logistical issue. It's also not very proportional on a national level, as it relies on electorate boundary-setting, but this is an issue of perspective rather than a mathematical flaw: STV represents electorates proportionally, while for example list systems represent party affiliations proportionally throughout the nation. So STV is a good system for those who like local representation, wheras those who want party proportionality (for instance, to fairly represent smaller parties) will probably want to look towards list systems as their preferred way to vote. Also, it should be noted somewhere (or perhaps Disambigged?) that STV is sometimes used as a name for IRV single-winner elections, as New Zealand calls all of its IRV elections (such as for Wellington Mayor) Single Transferrable Vote. --54x (talk) 03:51, 25 September 2015 (UTC)

As discussed on this Talk page last year (see under POV above), I would like to propose a general re-write. Trying to be as transparent and cooperative with others as possible, I'll do this in stages, beginning with some pruning. If anyone else would like to help, let me know.

I've started by simply deleting the section on `Determining ultimate preferences'. This is/was about the special case of electing one individual, i.e. Instant Runoff / Alternative Vote; if it belongs anywhere it should be on the Instant runoff voting page. However, it is also over-specialised, possibly only of Australian interest, and has no citations, so I think it needs radical improvement if it is to be resurrected anywhere on Wikipedia.

Dmollison (talk) 15:10, 22 October 2016 (UTC)

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Two things that could be added.

• The local uses of STV in the US include |Park board and library board elections in Minneapolis, Minnesota - but didnt figure out how to add to chart

• Congressman Don Beyer has introduced the Fair Representation Act, HR 3057, this year to enact STV for U.S. House elections - see FairRepresentation.com

RRichie (talk) 00:04, 2 July 2017 (UTC)

The section, Degree of Proportionality, claims that STV reduces "the number of unrepresented or disenfranchised voters". This is not correct. People who have the right to vote are enfranchised, even if their horse does not win. Furthermore, any elected representative will tell you that they represent everyone in their riding, even those who voted for someone else. However, you certainly may feel unrepresented if your horse does not win, and it is this feeling of non-representation that STV is addressing. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Normvcr (talk • contribs) 13:54, 24 October 2019 (UTC)

This review is transcluded from Talk:Single transferable vote/GA1. The edit link for this section can be used to add comments to the review.

Reviewer: David Eppstein (talk · contribs) 07:11, 28 January 2018 (UTC)

Wikipedia:Good article criteria quick fail criterion #3: "It has, or needs, cleanup banners that are unquestionably still valid." This article's cleanup tags include:

• Articles with unsourced statements from November 2016
• Vague or ambiguous geographic scope from December 2016
• Articles with unsourced statements from July 2010
• Articles with unsourced statements from October 2010
• Wikipedia articles needing clarification from November 2016
• Articles with specifically marked weasel-worded phrases from April 2014

In addition there are whole paragraphs and even whole sections without proper sources. This article was not ready for GA nomination, much as I'd like to see this topic reach GA status. Please handle these issues, and check that every individual claim in every paragraph is supported by the next source within that paragraph, before resubmitting. —David Eppstein (talk) 07:11, 28 January 2018 (UTC)

The lead and some of this article is written as if all STV elections are in multiseat constituencies. I think this is more rare. Midgley (talk) 01:34, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

Thats the point of STV. In single seats its called Instant Runoff Voting. Superegz (talk) 22:33, 7 March 2020 (UTC)

Replace old example

I think the demonstration of the STV election is not very good for a the visualisation of an STV election. That it is about foods and the colorfulness suggests this was meant introduction of the basic clear steps of STV and possibly highlighting its consensus seeking properties and avoiding wasted votes. But the the use of X-s to show votes (when so far it has been highlighted that voters don't just vote with a single X, but rank with numbers) makes it a bit tiring to follow and not appealing visually (this applies to the mathematical notation as well). The example itself also shows an election where under SNTV more voters would get their first preferences elected and and nobody who didn't get at least their second preference, and the STV just does worse in this case.

It would also be good to then be able to compare it to what were the case with SNTV and block voting and FPTP with or without tactical voting and gerrymandering. But choosing foods does not work for this, as there is only one of each candidate, so there is no danger of all 3 foods being chocolate. Also, its not clear is their a limit on chocolate or why would they use a system where surplus chocolate voters voted would need to be recounted here, the whole setup is not at all like an election.

I propose to redo this example as two examples: One as a party-neutral election with preference profiles that even a casual reader could see why it makes sense. Preferably not with food, maybe animals (like in the well known STV explainer video on youtube) or just general candidate names. An another one in a two-party system, maybe in a larger district and highlighting features of representation that the first example could not.

I will think about these but wanted to share first, so anyone who knows why the example is like this could answer. Rankedchoicevoter (talk) 15:49, 30 April 2022 (UTC)

I agree. The simplest examples of STV counting can be found among the pages of Irish constituencies, that provide the detailed results for every past election. The tables are rarely bloated as this one. They provide a rough understanding of the counting results, although the process is more complex. Kahlores (talk) 19:20, 19 May 2022 (UTC)

That said, the Xs aren't as problematic as the commentary in the column to the right. Colouring can help understand how individual preferences are transferred, whereas the commentary bloats the table. Kahlores (talk) 00:51, 21 May 2022 (UTC)

I reworked the example to something that makes more sense according to above. Another problem, was previous example actually showed an example where SNTV would have performed better with 20 first preference, 3 second preferences chosen, STV only 19 first and 3 second preferences. I am still not convinced choosing food as an example makes much sense, but I kept it because I found a strawberry/chocolate cake icon in this iconset, which represents well that STV can help elect consensus candidates (as is the lead of article) and it shows that it can win even if first preferences are relatively fragmented between 3 candidates (chocolate, strawberry, cake).

But if there is a better representation, it still might be good to change. I deleted the column on the right, and wrote the steps explanation below. Feel free to modifiy if needed, or to add back the colours or Xs in some way Rankedchoicevoter (talk) 14:07, 6 June 2022 (UTC)

New example

June 2022. I like the new presentation of the demonstration election. but think it would be better if a candidate food was elected at the end with less than quota and if some votes were exhausted during vote transfers. the idea of fruit grouping is one way to go for the unfair representation elected through the Block Voting presentation but actually three strawberry dishes make more sense. Also one change made when we went to new demonstration election was to ensure that more were satisfied under STV than SNTV. That is good change. But we also want to show that SNTV may allow more first preferences to be elected than STV, but STV ensures that more see either their first or second or third preference elected than see their first preference elected under SNTV. most but not all those in winning position in the first round of STV election are elected in the end. Any who are not are replaced by those who had support of fewer voters in Round 1. so the final result under SNTV does satisfy more voters than votes as cast in the Round1 of a STV election. But STV election results satisfy more voters if we look at back-up preferences marked on ballots initially cast for initially-less-popular candidates. The new example does show that, when it shows Oranges, one of the leaders in Round 1, not elected at the end. while cake, initially less popular, picks up vote transfers from chocolate and from strawberries to accumulate more votes than oranges and win. Oranges meanwhile is back-up preference of no voters (or at least none so marked are put into effect). so that does show STV producing more general satisfaction than SNTV.

To show a candidate food elected at the end with less than quota and some votes being declared exhausted during vote transfers, I suggest

Example for a non-partisan election

Suppose an election is conducted to determine what three foods to serve at a party. There are seven choices: Strawberry donuts, Pears, Strawberries, Cake (Strawberry-chocolate), Chocolate, Hamburgers and Chicken. Only three of these may be served.

There are 23 guests, and the hope is that each guest will be served at least one food that they are happy with. It is decided to use STV to make the decision. Each guest is given one vote but is also allowed to cast two optional back-up preferences to be used only if the first preference cannot select a food or to direct transfer of surplus votes if it does. The 23 guests at the party mark their ballots with first, second and third preferences. When the ballots are completed, there are nine distinct combinations, as shown in the table below:

1st preference
2nd preference
3rd preference
# of ballots	4	7	1	1	3	1	4	1	1

The table is read as columns: the left-most column shows that there were four ballots with Strawberry donut as the first choice, and Pear as second; while the rightmost columns show there were three ballots with Chicken as first choice (one of them has Hamburger as second choice).

The election step-by-step:

Step	Votes for each option
Setting the quota	The quota is 6
Step 1	4	7 ELECTED (1 surplus vote)	2	3	1	4	2
Step 2	4	ELECTED (6 votes)	1 + 1 = 2	3	1	4	2
Step 3	4	ELECTED (6 votes)	2	3 + 1 = 4	eliminated	4	2
Step 4	4	ELECTED (6 votes)	eliminated	4 + 2 = 6 ELECTED (6 votes) (0 surplus votes)	eliminated	4	2
Step 5	4	ELECTED (6 votes)	eliminated	ELECTED (6 votes)	eliminated	4 + 1 = 5 ELECTED (5 votes)	eliminated
Result		ELECTED (6 votes)		ELECTED (6 votes)		ELECTED (5 votes)

Setting the quota: The Droop quota formula is used, giving Quota = total votes / (options to choose + 1) + 1, rounded down = 23 / (3 +1) + 1 rounded down = 6.75 rounded down = 6

Step 1: First-preference votes are counted. Pears reaches the quota with 7 votes, and is therefore elected on the first count, with 1 surplus vote

Step 2: All of the voters who gave first preference to Pears preferred Strawberry next, so the surplus vote is awarded to Strawberry. No other option has reached the quota, and there are still two to elect with six options in the race, so elimination of lower-scoring options will start on the next round.

Step 3: Chocolate has the least votes and is eliminated. According to their only voter's next preference, this vote is transferred to Cake. No option has reached the quota, and there are still two to elect with five in the race, so elimination of options will continue next round.

Step 4: Of the remaining options, Strawberry and Chicken now have the least votes. Of the two, Strawberry has fewer first preference votes so is eliminated. According to the preferences of one of the two voters who voted Strawberry, and the voters of Pears who gave the surplus vote to Strawberry, two of the Strawberry votes are transferred to Cake, which reaches the quota and is elected. But Cake has no surplus votes. Another Strawberry vote has Pear marked as second preference but Pear has already been elected so cannot receive more votes. That vote is declared exhausted and taken out of the equation. No other option has reached the quota, and there is still one to elect with three in the race, so elimination of options will continue next round.

Step 5: Chicken has the least votes and is eliminated. Only one of the three votes carries a back-up preference. According to that Chicken voter's next preference, this vote is transferred to Hamburgers. Hamburgers is elected in next round because Strawberry donut has fewer votes. Hamburgers is elected although it does not have quota. There are no more seats to fill. The votes for strawberry donut (plus the "exhausted" votes initially marked for Strawberry and Chicken) are the only votes that are wasted, the only voters who are ignored.

Result: The winners are Pears, Cake, and Hamburgers.

Compared to other systems

This result differs from the one that would have occurred if the three winners were decided by first-preference plurality rankings (single non-transferable vote [SNTV]), in which case Orange would have been a winner, as opposed to Cake, for having a greater number of first-preference votes. STV in this case produced a higher number of effective votes – votes used to elect the successful candidates: 14 voters saw their first preference chosen, and the 9 others saw their second preference served.

Under SNTV, 15 voters would have seen their first preference win (Strawberry donuts, Pears and Hamburgers), the other 8 would not have seen their first choice served. Three of them would have seen their 2nd preference food served (this would not have been marked so would likely not have been known). Five voters would have none of their favorite foods served.

Under first-past-the-post (FPTP), the guests would have been split into three groups with one food chosen by each group based on just first preferences. The result in this case would have been dependent on how the groups are formed (gerrymandering of the groups to bias the election toward a particular result could also occur). It might have been Strawberry donuts, Pears and Hamburgers, but also the foods chosen might have been Pears in two groups (districts) and Hamburgers in the other. Or even just Pears alone might have won in each of the three "districts", in which case only 7 guests out of 23 would have seen their choice served, a very unrepresentative outcome, given that three different foods could have been served.

Similar problems arise to a lesser degree if all districts use a majority system instead of plurality (for instance, two-round or instant-runoff voting) as at least in all districts the majority would have been quite happy, but that still leaves the minority unrepresented.

It could also happen that none of the groups elect Pears, because the 7 votes for it are split and in each other "district" there is another food that beats it (e.g. Strawberry donuts, Hamburgers and Chicken).

If the voters had been able to choose only one food to serve (as in first-past-the-post, but without "districts"), it is likely that Pears, the choice of less than a third of the 23 party-goers, would have won, meaning Pears would be the only food served at the party.

Even if they held two rounds of voting, with one winner, the nine voters who prefer some kind of strawberry dish) would have dominated all other choices.

If the election had been held using Block voting, likely Strawberry would have won and been the only food served, although there were potentially three different foods served. The result produced by the STV election above was not simply result of giving voters more votes (in fact STV is single voting), and Block voting, where votes cast multiple votes, does not actually produce a more fair result or ensure that more votes are happy with result than single voting under STV. Giving electors a single transferable vote is very different from simply giving each voters more votes to cast. Block Voting, where each voter is given as many votes as there can be winners, is called plurality block voting. It can produce very unrepresentative results.

A single group with only a minority of the votes could pick all the winners if it is larger than any other single group. Being able to cast multiple votes means that a group would not need to worry about vote splitting due to too many candidates in the running (unless the group runs more candidate than there are seats).

In the example above, if every voter could vote for three options, the group of voters who chose a strawberry or a strawberry dish could easily force all three outcomes to be strawberry related (strawberries, strawberry cake or strawberry donut): an outcome that is unlikely to be more representative than each voter simply casting one vote. In the example above, where no faction commands an absolute majority, the largest of the minority groups can force a one-outcome result by running clone candidates - various strawberry dishes.

The nine lovers of strawberry arranged in advance to have three types of strawberry foods included on the ballot, then cast all their votes for the three, and if no other option is more popular than the "strawberry" slate (candidates on that slate could take 9 votes each if strawberry lovers vote along slate lines), the three foods served would be three types of strawberry. The only way this could be avoided would be for those who do not like strawberries, or at least ten of them, to vote tactically, by not choosing their various preferred options, but instead all moving to support the same three non-strawberry candidates - whatever they consider to be the least bad alternative to strawberries that is likely to gain enough votes to be elected, the best chance non-strawberry contender. But if that voter discipline is not pursued, the Strawberry coalition will see three strawberry dishes served and no others.

The proportionality section is getting a little apologetic again, saying that it is impossible to determine whether first preferences reflect party preferences, and saying this twice. It is in fact easier to measure for STV than for any one candidate per party system or SNTV since the proportion of people who transfer from a candidate of one party to a candidate of a different party when they could have gone to a candidate of the same party can be measured. It might be sensible to look at early transfers to avoid donkey vote effects. In Malta a quick clance suggests this seems to be about 1%, in Northern Ireland perhaps about 15-20%, at least for distinctive parties - the smaller non-sectarian parties seem to swap votes more. --Henrygb 22:10, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC)

• A measure of party loyalty, however, is still not a measure of party preferences. For instance, it could be the case that the first five candidates on my ballot represent moderates from another party. More importantly, you need a mechanism for distinguishing between early defectors (say, one who ranks only one or two candidates for a party before choosing another) and late defectors (say, one who ranks all but one candidate from the same party before picking candidates from another) - do you count them both equally as members of the same party, or both equally as defectors? Scott Ritchie 23:08, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC)

I found this:

${\displaystyle {\text{transferred votes given to the next preference}}=\left({\frac {\text{votes for next preference belonging to the original candidate}}{\text{total votes for the original candidate}}}\right)*{\text{surplus votes for original candidate}}}$

I changed it to this:

${\displaystyle {\text{transferred votes given to the next preference}}=\left({\frac {\text{votes for next preference belonging to the original candidate}}{\text{total votes for the original candidate}}}\right)\times {\text{surplus votes for original candidate}}}$

The use of an asterisk for that purpose is a workaround for occasions when one is limited to the characters on the keyboard. Its use in this context is vulgar (except perhaps in some instances of a deliberately affected style having that and other non-standard features, but that's not appropriate for Wikipedia).2601:445:4380:7DD0:F478:9959:9044:601A (talk) 21:47, 25 December 2020 (UTC)

actually I think this would be better:

${\displaystyle {\text{votes to be transferred from original candidate to Candidate B}}=\left({\frac {\text{votes of the original candidate where next usable marked preference is for B}}{\text{total votes for the original candidate}}}\right)\times {\text{surplus votes for original candidate}}}$

— Preceding unsigned comment added by 174.3.203.119 (talk) 19:52, 10 November 2022 (UTC)

I been forced to an unnecessary edit war with a user named Joeyconnick, over pointlessly obessed over I submitted to the being accused of using "bad" grammar as the sole (and weak) reason to repeated undoing my edit(s); instead of reworking it or improving that sentence, which contain a couple of sources from politically organizational websites like Fair Vote (which kinda funny that user to keep that same website's RCV/IRV page, next to my edited sentence, which was from the website's PRCV page?) or Ballotpedia, which makes me occasionally and gradually stressed out.

Along this user proclaims that common voting systems don't used alternative names/terms like for an example, Instant-runoff voting or here in the US as 'Ranked-choice voting' is being more common. But, other voting system like STV is supposedly don't have one??? Like what??? Chad The Goatman (talk) 05:11, 18 November 2022 (UTC)

Apparently Chad The Goatman doesn't understand edit-warring is forbidden, nor that you cannot use a wiki to source statements, per WP:UGC. They also don't understand how to write grammatically, since they are repeatedly adding the clearly error-riddled statement "It sometimes referred in recent years, within the United States as Proportional Ranked-choice voting (PRCV)", which, on top of not being proper English, isn't even capitalized properly.

Chad, please revert your poorly-worded, wrongly sourced addition immediately and stop edit-warring. —Joeyconnick (talk) 05:07, 18 November 2022 (UTC)

No, I do. But, it's just only a sentence (that well sure, was rushed, due of the aftermath of the 2022 United States elections got me to inspired this edit), that mentions in the US (in the past few years) has start calling Single transferable vote (which two-thirds of its name isn't capitalized, lmao) as Proportional Ranked-choice voting. You, however, keep instead, by lazily undoing my edit(s) nor even bother into looking of these two webpages so far, to make sure they're not personal (where these two may more likely not qualifed as user-generated content websites and/or either of them aren't my, as a contributor, as you are treating me off?) as these two are political. For like improving it and searched it to a least back me up.

Along, that other voting system pages like IRV, RV or Two-round or the page's term section has alternative names/terms at the top of their pages, with none of them were forced removed, just because most countries are calling these voting systems, by there original names. Chad The Goatman (talk) 05:23, 18 November 2022 (UTC)