Talk:Sino-Indian War/Archive 9

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There have been a good deal of inputs from a large number of sources about the immediate causes for the Sino-Indian border conflict, but much less about the wider context in which it took place, and even less on China's unilateral ceasefire and withdrawal. Fortunately there are books by Steven Hoffman and John Garver and others that shed some light on the last aspect. The first thing that emerges is that Communist China has never liked to get into a war unless it is fairly sure that the circumstances overwhelmingly favour a victory - that is, it would not like to get bogged down to a long-drawn conflict to further its interests. The Sino Indian War of 1962 and the Sino Vietnam conflict in 1979 are examples of this. Secondly, both the US and the Soviet Union were critical of Communist China's attack on India and gave material and moral support to India as possible. It was just possible that one or the other would have got involved in some way if China had persisted in thrusting further into India, or had not declared the Unilateral Ceasefire and withdrawn. It may have also opened up the possibilities of a thrust into southern China from Taiwan and to a wider war. Third, it is no easy thing to maintain lines of communications and war supplies to a zone that is about 1500 kilometres from nearest major Chinese bases such as Kunming or Chamdo, and by end of November the area would get completely snowed in (the Ceasefire came on 20th November. It is also said the morale and condition of the PLA just at that time in 1962 were not at the peak, with cut in rations due to failure of crops and the persistent attacks on their columns by Khampa rebels. Much more therefore needs to be learnt about Chinese intentions and motives and compulsions for the Sino Indian conflict of 1962. Pidiji (talk) 02:31, 3 October 2013 (UTC)

A report by Margaret Fisher and Leo Rose ("England, India, Nepal, Tibet, China", University of Berkeley, 1959) has shed light on some aspects of the status of Chinese "Ambans" or "Residents" in Tibet. Their report covers the period 1765 to 1958 and reveals that in these 193 year, there were no Chinese Ambans or Residents posted at Lhasa for 131 years; the longest continued absence being for 21 years from 1913 to 1933. It is also of note that the Ambans were present for just one or two months in a year in Lhasa in 57 years. This may be of interest to researchers in Sino-Tibetan historyPidiji (talk) 02:30, 21 November 2013 (UTC)

There seems to be bias in the dismissal of the Johnson line, (citing at 8 an obscure report which in any event doesn't actually say quite what the article does, and then going on to marginal character assassination of Johnson), and saying that it extended the border claimed 'further into China' - which presupposes the territory was Chinese, when this is after all what is in dispute. In any event since present tense is used reference to China is an anachronism - in the relevant part of Johnson's asserted border, the neighboring nation was Tibet. Suggest a rewrite of that para to remove bias. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 222.153.96.151 (talk) 09:54, 13 December 2013 (UTC)

Thanks are due to 222.153.96.151 for the comments on the so-called Johnson Line. While no doubt the Sino-indian border was not physically demarcated on the the ground, it was fairly well-known by tradition, customs, and even by treaty. There does seem therefore to be definite bias in some circles in describing and defining the border favouring China; although the "the balance of evidence" distinctly favours the Indian position. At the bottom line, the border involves the security concerns of both India and China that have to be understood and addressed. So far the border has held for more than 50 years - it surely can then hold for 150 years, or for that matter 250 years. Pidiji (talk) 01:59, 22 December 2013 (UTC)

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in Rezang La alone 1700 Chinese were killed .then why in the front page of Sino-India war chinese casaulities mention only 722.Please this and it should me more than that. Ashokyadav13 (talk) 10:28, 29 January 2014 (UTC)

You need to provide a source. Darkness Shines (talk) 10:37, 29 January 2014 (UTC)

This is with regard to this revert of the description I added to the infobox: [1]. As per MOS:INFOBOX, 'References are not needed in infoboxes if the content is repeated (and cited) in the body of the article or if the information is obvious.' The article does refer many times to both Indian and Chinese posts and patrols in Aksai Chin, hence I do not see the need for references for this description. But feel free to add references if you wish. If you find the description too wordy, I invite you to improve it rather than delete it. The Discoverer (talk) 03:59, 1 December 2013 (UTC)

Looks like no one will agree with your changes of infobox. You haven't mentioned that Arunachal pradesh was siege by India, neither you added that Aksai chin was "given" to China, since china had withdrawn once already. Justicejayant (talk) 09:58, 4 January 2014 (UTC)

• The point is that it is totally incorrect to use 'Status quo ante bellum' because by definition, the term 'Status quo ante bellum' can be used only if the Chinese troops had withdrawn to the positions held before the commencement of hostilities on 20 October 1962, the date of the beginning of the war. However, Chinese troops withdrew to the 7 November 1959 positions, which were different from the 19 October 1962 positions.
• Arunachal Pradesh is not mentioned because there were no territorial changes there. India controlled Arunachal Pradesh before the war, then China occupied it and withdrew, and India controlled it after the war too. If you have any source that shows what territorial changes occurred in Arunachal Pradesh, please add these changes.
• Irrespective of whether Aksai Chin was given to China, or annexed by China, the fact is that before the war, both countries had posts in Aksai Chin and patrolled there. Since the end of the war, Aksai Chin has been under complete Chinese control.

The Discoverer (talk) 11:23, 4 January 2014 (UTC)

The Discoverer, for now I think you should blank that section once again. Considering that the aksai chin wasn't won by China, but actually given, there are no sources that says that China won the territory. It just says that China withdrew from all regions, and by 1993 - 1996, both India and China had the LOC. Justicejayant (talk) 06:02, 13 January 2014 (UTC)

Justicejayant, I am not aware of a single source that says that any territory whatsoever was given to China in the years after the war ended. China withdrew to the Chinese claim line in Aksai Chin, which corresponds to today's LAC, and not to the Indian claim line, and that is why you are finding a discrepancy.The Discoverer (talk) 06:27, 13 January 2014 (UTC)

"Chinese troops withdrew to the 7 November 1959 positions, which were different from the 19 October 1962 positions." Do you have any source for that?

"Before the war, both countries had posts in Aksai Chin and patrolled there." From what I've read, India's patrolling stopped after the 1959 Kongka Pass clash. Do you have sources saying they still had posts in Aksai Chin after that? -Zanhe (talk) 07:05, 14 January 2014 (UTC)

• From Chapter 2 of India's China War, which describes the Forward Policy (1959 to 1962): "India refused to open negotiations, and steadily pushed forward, first in the middle and eastern sectors and now in the west."
• From Calvin's account: "By the end of 1961, Nehru had sent enough Indian Army troops into Aksai Chin to establish about 43 posts on the Ladakh frontier claimed by China."
• Excerpts from Calvin's timeline:

1961 - Nehru sends troops and border patrols into disputed frontier areas to establish outposts; skirmishes increased in late 1961

July, 1962 - Skirmishes in Aksai Chin

October 20-21, 1962 - Chinese launch simultaneous attacks in Aksai Chin, successful against Galwan Valley and Chip Chap Valley posts

November 18, 1962 - Chinese successful at Chushul; no Indian force remains in Aksai Chin

• Places like Gurung Hill, Sirijap and the Spanggur region where battles were fought during the war are today under Chinese control.
• To conclude: From 1959 till the war, Indian posts and patrols were in Aksai Chin. China defeated the Indian troops in Aksai Chin. This tells us that the positions at the beginning of the war (20 October 1962) were different from those at the end of the war (7 November 1959 positions)

The Discoverer (talk) 13:27, 14 January 2014 (UTC)

Zanhe is correct, and certainly you should present the source, that support exactly the same way you have presented. Otherwise don't add, you can't mix 2 information with each other. Justicejayant (talk) 05:50, 31 January 2014 (UTC)

With respect to the field 'Territorial changes' in the infobox, by definition, the term 'Status quo ante bellum' can be used only if the Chinese troops had withdrawn to the positions held before the commencement of hostilities on 20 October 1962, the date of the beginning of the war. Since the Chinese troops withdrew to the 7 November 1959 positions, which were different from the 19 October 1962 positions, it is incorrect to use the term 'status quo ante bellum' . The Discoverer (talk) 11:41, 24 November 2013 (UTC)

it can be used in the context of arunachal pradesh then, because status quo ante bellum was achieved there..--Rishab1996 (talk) 14:56, 7 February 2014 (UTC)

the greater effects of the war in India and china should also be mentioned, like the complete up-gradation of the Indian army, the cautionary way that china was treated after the war, not only by India, but other neighbours and the US as well and also the way the patriotism spread by the war lead to the decline of a separate independent state in south India. --Rishab1996 (talk) 15:03, 7 February 2014 (UTC)

The Sino-Indian dispute is said to have arisen because of differing perceptions of where the boundary lay, that is about the extent of the respective territories. This was because the border had not been demarcated on the ground, despite being quite well-known over centuries due to customs and practice and in some sectors, as well in the context of certain treaties. After the unilateral cease-fire on 20th November 1962 by China, the latter withdrew to the MacMahon Line in the eastern sector and practically to the 1959 Line of Actual Control in the Western Sector. The Indian Prime Minister, Nehru, had at one point of time suggested withdrawal by China to the 1959 position as a basis for subsequent negotiations. But China kept creeping in further in 1960 in the Ladakh area. Was that not a form of "Forward Policy" by China, an accusation that is usually held against India? Whether and to what extent the USA helped India at the time (and they did) and the numbers of casualties on either side should not obscure the basic issue of the dispute over territory and borders. Pidiji (talk) 01:45, 13 June 2014 (UTC)

Any objection to mentioning under the In Popular Culture section that in the television series Earth: Final Conflict, a second Sino-Indian War is a main plot mentioned throughout the first 4 seasons (and with two dedicated episodes) as a conflict taking place shortly before the arrival of an alien race? Fry1989 ^eh? 06:49, 27 June 2014 (UTC)

I think it would not be suitable, the reason being that this article is about the first (and only) Sino-Indian War, so the plot does not include the subject of this article, although it is related.The Discoverer (talk) 07:41, 27 June 2014 (UTC)

@The Discoverer: Your recent edit extensively relies upon non-neutral Indian sources. Even worse is your misrepresentation of the respected Harvard scholar Roderick MacFarquhar, who you claim to have criticized Neville Maxwell's findings in The Origins of the Cultural Revolution. The truth is, MacFarquhar extensively cites Maxwell in his book, and reaches the same conclusion as him. On page 298, for example, MacFarquhar writes: "It is clear that the Sino-Indian War of October 1962 was, at least in part, China's reaction to what came to be known in New Delhi as India's 'forward policy'". The article is already severely unbalanced, citing numerous Indian sources and very few Chinese ones. With an abundance of neutral, scholarly sources available, it serves no purpose to rely on partisan sources, unless your goal is to push your personal POV. -Zanhe (talk) 07:11, 2 October 2014 (UTC)

Zanhe, please do not defame any source by calling them 'non-neutral' unless you have evidence to that effect. The source I have cited clearly states "Rod­erick MacFarquhar had argued, by dub­bing the 1962 war ‘Mao’s India war’, that it was the Chinese who were the agg­ressors." Further in 'The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, vol. 3', he clearly explains how Mao's decision to attack was due to reversals of his past policies and his weakened domestic position. Having said that, I do not mean to preclude that MacFarquhar believed that India's policy was a partial factor or an excuse for Mao to wage war, but clearly MacFarquhar believes that it was not the sole factor.

Your complete removal, even of mention of other scholars who share this viewpoint clearly demonstrates that you are unwilling to accept the inclusion of a point of view that you do not agree with, even when it is held by noteworthy scholars like Roderick MacFarquhar, Bertil Lintner, Brahma Chellaney and Rana Mitter, which shows the extent of your bias.

Again, it is surprising that you haven't noticed that I did not add my own POV, but that infact this is the POV of the aforementioned scholars. WP:NPOV demands that we atleast state the opposite point of view.

• That's exactly the problem of citing partisan sources like outlookindia.com, which you rely on almost exclusively. They distort and quote out of context scholarly research to serve their POV. I have read the relevant parts of MacFarquhar's book, and you obviously haven't. In the section titled "Mao's India war", MacFarquhar makes no mention of the Great Leap Forward or Mao's domestic problems. See page 308. If anything, in the previous section titled "India's forward policy", he states that China's economic crisis, coupled with its split with the Soviet Union, and the threat of invasion from Taiwan, led India to believe that they could push ahead with the "Forward Policy" without having to worry too much about China contemplating "major hostilities". See page 298. -Zanhe (talk) 22:34, 2 October 2014 (UTC)

On top of all of this bias, you still claim that the article is over balanced towards the Indian side, when in fact the article is clearly pro-China, with every attempt being made to blame India's policies for the war, while entirely glossing over the fact that India was merely responding to the posts set up by China, after the annexation of Tibet in 1950 'like a rape victim being scolded for inviting the attack'.

As for the absence of Chinese sources, why don't you add them yourself? The reason is Chinese censorship. As the scholar Garver said: "Absence of evidence sho­­uld not, in this case, be taken as evidence of absence, (...) Chinese documents on sensitive foreign affairs issues are dribbled out by Beijing with an eye to ensuring foreign scholars reach relatively benign conclusions."

The Discoverer (talk) 13:17, 2 October 2014 (UTC)

Are you serious? You really want me to add statements like "the McMahon line is illegal and Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory" citing Chinese books such as The Historical Status of China's Tibet? Sorry, but I'm no fan of nationalistic propaganda, either Chinese or Indian. In fact, I revert pro-Chinese POV pushers as readily as I do pro-Indian ones. See [2] and [3], for example. -Zanhe (talk) 22:52, 2 October 2014 (UTC)

"Like a rape victim being scolded for inviting the attack"? Quoting an Indian firebrand commentator well known for his hawkish views, while dismissing Western scholarly consensus as "pro-China", simply shows your true colour as an nationalistic Indian POV-pusher. -Zanhe (talk) 19:10, 3 October 2014 (UTC)

Chellaney's being an author with hawkish views does not imply that he is not an objective observer. Outlook is a reputed publication and a WP:Reliable Source. In the chapter 'Mao changes the signals', MacFarquhar wrote about how Mao's policies were being reversed, and his position weakened, and what he did about it. I cannot find an online version, but I found this summary. Also, vol. 2 of the trilogy 'Origins of the cultural revolution' is titled 'The Great Leap Forward', so MacFarquhar has described that as well.

I commend you for these examples of your reversions of pro-Chinese POV pushers.

I did not say that the Western scholarly consensus is Pro-China. What I said is that the article is over balanced towards the pro-China viewpoint, the reason being that you are not willing to include the other point of view. I have said earlier that I do not deny that Indian policies were a factor, but I have only been trying to include other viewpoints as well.The Discoverer (talk) 19:31, 3 October 2014 (UTC)

When I added 'MacFarquhar criticised Maxwell', that was clearly an error on my part; I apologise for that.

I mentioned the chapter 'Mao's India War' in the citation by mistake, when I was referring to 'Mao changes the signals'. That seems to be the source of the confusion. Following is an excerpt from the chapter 'Mao changes the signals':

“

It is not difficult to understand why Mao launched this sudden counter-attack [during the 10th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee in Sep. 1962]. He was faced with what he saw as fundamental and unacceptable changes in key areas of policy: a rolling back of collectivization in the countryside which would have undermined his whole vision for a socially transformed China; and a détente with the Soviet Union, which could have undermined his search for a distinctive Chinese road. In his eyes, this was 'peaceful evolution' towards capitalism. Moreover, the changes were reversals of his own past policies. (...) The counter-attack on the external front (against India) was the other side of the one on the internal front (against revisionism and Soviet Union).

”

The reversal of policies taking place at the 10th Plenum of the 8th CC was due to the failure of the Great Leap Forward. (This is also in the book). Therefore it's clear that MacFarquhar is saying that the attack against India has to do with the effects of the Great Leap Forward.

I have reworked the section related to the domestic developments in China as a factor to try address concerns raised. The Discoverer (talk) 15:28, 4 October 2014 (UTC)

After Zanhe pointed it out to me, I've realised that I probably wrongly attributed the sentence "The counter-attack on the external front (against India) was the other side of the one on the internal front (against revisionism and Soviet Union)" to MacFarquhar so I've removed it from the article. It was unintentional. My apologies. The Discoverer (talk) 17:45, 6 October 2014 (UTC)

• To summarize The Discoverer's second "unintentional" mistake above: he plagiarized the analysis from Claude Arpi's blog. In the process he mistook Arpi's comment as a quote from Roderick MacFarquhar's book, and added the false claim, together with the false quote, that MacFarquhar says the Great Leap Forward was one of the reasons that Mao decided for war, to this article, as well as on the article Neville Maxwell. The complete discussion can be seen at Talk:Neville Maxwell#Edits on Influence section. -Zanhe (talk) 05:04, 7 October 2014 (UTC)

Zanhe, kindly refrain from making false accusations against me. From the book, one can clearly realise that MacFarquhar says the effects of the great leap forward were part of the reason for the decision to go to war. I will point out the corresponding text from the book later.

You have removed text from the article again, saying that the sources are "neither neutral nor reliable enough to support such an extraordinary claim". First of all, you would need to prove that the sources are not neutral and reliable, and secondly, this is a view held by a significant section of academia, and is not extraordinary.The Discoverer (talk) 16:58, 7 October 2014 (UTC)

The recent exchange of notes between Zahne and The Discoverer has been interesting. Firstly one must access sources before one may use or misuse the sources as one wishes. Some additional sources that may also be referred to are -

• (1) Zahiruddin Ahmed, “China and Tibet 1708-1959 : Resume of Facts” (Chatham House Memoranda, 1960)
• (2) Bunkyo Aoki, “Study on Early Tibetan Chronicles”, (Nippon Gakujitsu Shinkokai, 1955)
• (3) Valentine Chu, “The Inside Story of Communist China” (George Allen and Unwin, 1963)
• (4) John Fairbanks (ed.), “The Chinese World Order”, (Harvard University Press, 1968)
• (5) Margaret Fisher, L. E. Rose and R.A. Huttenback, “Himalayan Battleground” (Frederick A. Praeger, 1963)
• (6) Margaret Fisher and Leo Rose, “India, Nepal, Tibet, China”, (monograph, University of California, Berkeley, 1959)
• (7) Francine Frankel, ed., “The India-China Relationship” (Oxford University Press, 2004
• (8) John Garver, “Protracted Contest”, (Oxford University Press, 2001)
• (9) Alastair Lamb, “The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh” (Australian National University Press, 1973)
• (10) Francis Watson, “The Frontiers of China” (Chatto and Windus, 1966)
• (11) Dorothy Woodman, “Himalayan Frontiers” (Barrie & Rockliff, 1969)

As would be seen there are no Chinese sources given here for the reason that few are publicly accessible and even the Chinese articles on the subject seen on the Internet in 2010/2011 do not add anything to the Chinese position of 1961/62. A much wider reading on the subject beyond an article here or an article there is called for. Pidiji (talk) 02:41, 8 October 2014 (UTC)

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I request to edit this page because I found a mistake in citation number 65. The page indicated is incorrect. It should be pages 174-175 instead of 125. Rc75 (talk) 08:47, 20 December 2014 (UTC)

Done Paper found online here. Sam ^Sing! 14:04, 20 December 2014 (UTC)

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The "Persecution of Chinese Indians" section contains the following sentence: "The broad language of the act allowed for the arrest of any person simply for having a Chinese surname, a drop of Chinese blood, or a Chinese spouse." This is too colloquial for an encyclopedia and should be amended to read: "The broad language of the act allowed for the arrest of any person simply for having a Chinese surname, Chinese ancestry or a Chinese spouse." Hearingdouble (talk) 14:20, 30 December 2014 (UTC)

 Done OccultZone (Talk • Contributions • Log) 14:30, 30 December 2014 (UTC)

The infobox states that the area has since been under "complete Chinese control." I think that "complete" should be removed, as it doesn't add anything of substance to the article ("has been under complete Chinese control" doesn't give any more information than "has been under Chinese control"). Please let me know what your ideas on this are, I just wanted to get a few opinions before I edit it myself. CarnivorousBunny^talk 21:24, 18 January 2015 (UTC)

As of 00:59, 20 January 2015 (UTC) I have removed the words in question; if anyone disagrees with the removal, feel free to revert it, but I would request that the person let me know why (either here or on my talk page). Thanks. CarnivorousBunny^talk 00:59, 20 January 2015 (UTC)

. 207.219.3.250 (talk) 15:54, 9 June 2015 (UTC)

A recent book by Bruce Riedel ("JFK's Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-Indian War), a former CIA analyst and current scholar at the Brookings Institution, states that U.S. President John F. Kennedy in fact agreed to the Indian requests for military aid, and that this aid was one of the major reasons that Mao implemented a unilateral ceasefire. The book also notes that aid was requested of the British as well, which was particularly humiliating for Indian PM Nehru since he had been one of the leading figures in the Indian independence movement from Britain. The book has been widely written about; here is a recent media link: http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/jawaharlal-nehru-sought-us-assistance-during-1962-indo-china-war/ Ericfeinberg28 (talk) 05:40, 4 January 2016 (UTC)Eric Feinberg

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There is a type error in the "World opinion" section : "The Chinese military action has been viewed by the United States as part of the PRC's policy of making use of aggressive wars to settle its border disputes and to distract both its pwn population and international opinion from its internal issues."

PWN instead of OWN

"both its pwn population"

Brunasti (talk) 16:46, 16 May 2016 (UTC)

 Done thanks for pointing that out - Arjayay (talk) 17:12, 16 May 2016 (UTC)

Could somebody elaborate this statement please: According to former Indian diplomat G. Parthasarathy, "only after we got nothing from the US did arms supplies from the Soviet Union to India commence."

Is being quoted/sic/paraphrased? Can we change the words while keeping the same meaning? Also, I have no idea what that that G. Parthasarathy guy is sayin. Is he saying "only after we got nothing from US, the arms supplies from USSR to India commenced."?

usernamekiran (talk) 23:54, 15 January 2017 (UTC)

Das Gupta, Amit R., and Lüthi, Lorenz M. (eds.), The Sino-Indian War of 1962. New Perspectives,(New Delhi: Routledge, 2017) — Preceding unsigned comment added by ARDasgupta (talk • contribs) 17:44, 30 March 2017 (UTC)

The page, as per it's head line, is supposed to mention all the wars between India and China. There has been two wars, not one. This page has mentioned only the 1962 war which India lost and China won. There was another war in 1967 in present Sikkim state of India, and India won that war, China lost.

Please visit this page to learn about the Sikkim war-- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nathu_La_and_Cho_La_incidents That would be sincerely indiscrimantory to not to even mention about the second war.

^[1]

Thank You in Anticipation

I agree. The Second Sino-Indian War must be included. The Sino-Indian Border Conflict is branded as the First Sino-Indian War and the Nathu La & Cho La conflict is branded as the Second Sino-Inidan War. Page move is requested for Sino-Indian War to First Sino-Indian War and Nathu La & Cho La Incidents to Second Sino-Indian War. It is an increasingly common concensus among Wiki members. If we only brand the first conflict as a war, it is only a portrayal of the Chinese perspective; it is important to be neutral and unbiased. -Coconut1002

Those incidents are not considered as a second war. That was a skirmish between the Indian and Chinese forces. It cannot be termed as the Second Sino-Indian war. Please provide reliable sources which term that way. Adamgerber80 (talk) 06:24, 9 April 2017 (UTC)

Please make a simple clarification - at the end of the second paragraph, it currently reads: "and simultaneously announced its withdrawal from the disputed area." China withdrew from what is now Arunachal Pradesh, but did not withdraw from Aksai Chin. The current construction makes it look as if China withdrew from both locations - — Preceding unsigned comment added by 136.160.113.212 (talk) 19:23, 13 October 2015 (UTC)

Yes, changed the sentence and added withdrawal rather from 'one of the two disputed areas'. Also removed reference loss of land of Gilgit, Baltistan and parts of Kashmir to Pakistan in the same paragraph. These regions were occupied by Pakistan from an independent Jammu and Kashmir state in 1947, when it was not yet part of India. India never held this territories at the time Pakistan took it over. So I don't understand how India lost this to Pakistan. --ifesvr (talk) 21:43, 4 May 2017 (UTC)

Makes sense, 1ifes4v3r. - The Discoverer (talk) 15:25, 5 May 2017 (UTC)

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The high altitude and freezing conditions also cause logistical and welfare difficulties Word usage: replace "welfare difficulties" with "medical difficulties"

Indian artillery could not hold off against superior Chinese forces. Usage: delete "against", as it is not needed and awkward

However, the war ended with their withdrawal, so as to limit the amount of casualties.[9] Grammar correction: change "amount" to "number" (casualties is a non-count noun)

that while the war led to much blame, debates and ultimately acted as causation of military modernisation of India but the war is now treated as basic reportage of facts with relatively diminished interest by Chinese analysts.[73] Grammar correction: "while" and "but" have the same grammatical function in the sentence; only one or the other can be used, not both. Delete "but" and insert a comma after Style correction: replace "acted as a causation of " with "led to" for clarity and simplicity 73.99.8.10 (talk) 17:24, 7 July 2017 (UTC)

Not done: please establish a consensus for this alteration before using the {{edit semi-protected}} template. jd22292 (Jalen D. Folf) (talk) 17:59, 7 July 2017 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: Like I have said that I edited this article since 2013 and previously the section was "Johnson Line", per the actual name.[4] It goes in line with "McMahon Line", and it cannot be confused with Aksai Chin. By calling it Aksai Chin we are kinda marginalizing it. See this map, you will know that Aksai Chin was a great part of Johnson Line, but not entirely the only part. Capitals00 (talk) 14:22, 6 September 2017 (UTC)

The McMahon Line was negotiated between India and Tibet at the Simla Conference, and it clearly demarcated in a dozen maps signed by both the sides. The Johnson Line doesn't have any status like that. It was just a first effort, carried out in less than a month and lot of it was impressionistic. But the section currently titled Aksai Chin discusses all the historical background of the area, not a particular line.

Regarding "Aksai Chin", I know there are multiple meanings, but in the common sense of the term, it is the entire region east and northeast of the Karakorum range till the Kunlun mountains. That is what this section is about. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:33, 6 September 2017 (UTC)

Johnson Line "aligned the boundary of the Aksai Chin region of Ladakh to Kuen Lun mountains with the Aksai Chin plateau and the Karakoram mountains between them."[5] It also says that until 1950s, no one heard about Aksai Chin. So why we are referring these matters as Aksai Chin? That are way older and broader. Capitals00 (talk) 14:41, 6 September 2017 (UTC)

Well, we are not in 1950s any more. Aksai Chin is the widely used term in the current literature. See for example, the page 9 of the Hoffman book cited above. Honestly, I think we have more important things to worry about than section title. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:34, 6 September 2017 (UTC)

Contested content:

The Discoverer, These reverts are unjustified. Shahidullah is to the north of the Karakoram pass, along the trade route from Leh to Yarkand. It is not in Aksai Chin. The Maharaja's guardhouse at Shahidullah has nothing to do with Aksai Chin. The discussion of this source on pp. 26-27 does make it clear that the Maharaja did not exercise any control east of the Karakoram range. There is no mention of collecting "taxes". Rather it says

"He has never had any rights [there, and] it is the more astonishing that our recent maps have given effect to his now abandoned claim, and have included within his frontier a tract where he does not possess a square yard of ground and whose only inhabitants are the subjects of another state."

These are traveller's words of course, but they are being relayed by a reliable source. To contradict it, you need to provide an RS of equal standing that says something to the opposite. Mere bluster is not enough. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:17, 31 August 2017 (UTC)

This excerpt from a report of the meetings between the governments of India and China explains that the caravan routes from Ladakh to Shahidulla went through Aksai Chin. It also states that there exist records of revenue collections from the entire Aksai Chin region by the state of Kashmir, and the maintainence of the caravan routes by Kashmir. The book " Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh" by Fischer et al has many details about the evidence that Kashmir excercised control over Aksai Chin.

In light of the facts stated in these two sources, we cannot write based on a stray comment in Maxwell's book that the extent of the Maharaja's control was till the Karakoram range.

The Discoverer (talk) 11:42, 31 August 2017 (UTC)

Government documents are only good for Government claims. They don't make up reliable sources. Please feel free to provide a quotation from Fisher et al. which contradicts the content.

My content also finds support from Mohan Guruswamy, who says:

W.H. Johnson’s controversial ‘advanced boundary line’ of 1865, merits some attention,... The boundary line first found concrete shape in the Survey of India’s 1868 map and the Kashmir Atlas. It was based on the Kashmir Maharaja’s outpost at Shahidulla. This made Johnson opt for the Kuen Lun watershed as the divide, and not as some later surveyors were to do, on the main of the Karakoram.^[1]

So, Johnson "advanced" the boundary line, which did not have a "concrete shape" earlier. Later surveyors continued to use Karakoram as the main boundary. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:37, 31 August 2017 (UTC)

This is not about government claims, but rather it is about hard documentary evidence of Kashmiri administration of Aksai Chin that the government has already presented to Chinese officials. The relevant pages in Fisher are pp. 91-99. They also speak about such documentary evidence. You can find out more if you read about the details of the meetings about the boundary question, even from independent sources.

I do not see merit in supporting this statement by oblique references. Ideally, this big statement should be supported by an independent reliable source that unequivocally states that the Maharaja's control was limited to the Karakoram. The very fact that the Maharaja had troops posted at Shahidulla indicates that this was not the case. Moreover taking into account that the troops would have to pass through Qizil Jilga or Haji Langar to get to Shahidulla.

The Discoverer (talk) 17:07, 31 August 2017 (UTC)

You seem experienced enough in Wikipedia, but you ignore the role or non-role of WP:PRIMARY sources. You cannot remove WP:SECONDARY source material based on PRIMARY. If you have material in Fisher that contradicts Maxwell and Guruswamy, you are welcome to add it, but you can't get rid of what the original reliably sourced content. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:37, 31 August 2017 (UTC)

Firstly, your statement about the extent of control is derived from the sources in a round-about way. You are coming to a conclusion that is not explicitly stated by any of the sources, and this constitutes Original Research (see WP:SYNTH). Secondly, Fisher, which is a reliable secondary source, states that there is hard documentary evidence for the Kashmiri control of Aksai Chin. Unfortunately, I do not have the book at hand, so I cannot give you a direct quote. But that is no reason to reject it. Besides, the relevant material runs over several pages.

Therefore, since there is no explicit source for your statement, and because it contradicts a reliable secondary source, I suggest we change the relevant portion.

The Discoverer (talk) 18:27, 31 August 2017 (UTC)

Now you are wikilawyering. WP:SYNTH means stating a conclusion that is not implied by the sources. The sources clearly imply what I wrote. Wikipedia always summarises the sources in our own words. That is not WP:OR.

I am afraid you do have to find the source that purportedly contradicts these conclusions and explain how it contradicts them. Please don't expect that we will take your word and your memory that it contradicts them. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:12, 31 August 2017 (UTC)

WP:SYNTH clearly states that you cannot reach a conclusion that is not explicitly stated by the source. To put it in very simple words: your statement regarding the extent of control is not stated in any of the sources you mentioned. Maxwell just speaks about skepticism on the part of the commenters, and Guruswamy says that the boundary was first defined by Johnson. None of the sources state that the Maharaja's control extended upto the Karakoram range. Thus, your statement constitutes original research.The Discoverer (talk) 04:58, 1 September 2017 (UTC)

Wrong reading of policy. The sentence you pick this from talks about combining material from multiple sources. Here, we are dealing with a single source. The source does say:

Another traveller in these regions stated that the line along the east of the Karakoram range, from the Karakoram Pass to the Changchenmo River 'may be definitely fixed in its geographical and political bearing as constituting the limit of the Maharajah of Kashmir's dominions to the north'.[28]

Of course, the traveller could have been wrong, and the way to prove it wrong would be to bring in new sources which contradict the traveller. But you are not doing that. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:14, 1 September 2017 (UTC)

I have scoured through the Fisher & Rose book. There is nothing about the issue in the pages you mentioned. The discussion starts on page 113. Page 116 has this sentence:

The Indians cited the travel accounts of a number of British survey teams and hunting parties that had traversed the Aksai Chin and Lingzi Tang on numerous occasions after 1860.

And, in fact the first "travel account" mentioned is that of Johnson itself. So, there is nothing in this source that contradicts the conclusion that, prior to Johnson, Kashmir did not exert any control on Aksai Chin. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:27, 1 September 2017 (UTC)

Following is an excerpt from the last paragraph of page 118 (emphasis is mine):

The Indians cited Kashmir state records (. . .) Revenue records were submitted showing that regular assessments and settlements of revenue were made from time to time and revenue collected from all inhabited places up to the Indian boundary alignment. Moreover, the large stretches of uninhabited territory in this area were shown in Kashmir revenue maps, and control was maintained through the levy of duties on flocks and pastures, in the maintenance of caravan routes and rest houses, and supervision over trading parties.

This is followed by a list of documents presented by India that range from 1865 to 1950. In the beginning of the chapter, the authors mention that they have checked most of the cited material, and the authors do not themselves cast any doubt on the authenticity of the Indian documents. This shows that Kashmir did exercise control over Aksai Chin.

The Discoverer (talk) 20:11, 1 September 2017 (UTC)

Nothing indicates that any of this was before the Johnson line, which was defined in 1865. The paragraph that you amended was dealing with the situation prior to 1865. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:56, 1 September 2017 (UTC)

Oh.. so that's what you're trying to say! :) It is not readily apparent that 'this point in time' refers to the period before 1865. I understood that as referring to a much wider period of time, including after 1865. Now that you have rewritten the paragraphs following the one in question, the context with regard to time is clearer. Could you replace 'At this point in time' with something more specific, like "In the late 1850s"? The Discoverer (talk) 19:45, 3 September 2017 (UTC)

It is a linear historical narrative starting from the conquest of Ladakh going up to 1947. I will think of rewording.

Regarding Johnson and Shahidullah, I am personally convinced that it was a joint plan by the Maharaja and Johnson. Johnson retired from the Survey of India soon after his trip to Khotan and entered the Maharaja's service. The expansionist hankerings of the Dogras are well known (they even wanted the whole of Tibet), but the British clamped down on them. So, the Maharaja had to work under the radar, and the so-called guard house at Shahidullah was an obvious effort to create facts on the ground. But I will look for sources that analyse this. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:06, 3 September 2017 (UTC)

Well the rewording would be important here. I am doubtful about Kashmir having any or enough control over Aksai Chin though. When I had edited the article last time, "Territorial changes" on infobox contained "Status quo ante bellum",[6] The Discoverer added the claims about Aksai Chin afterwards. Capitals00 (talk) 19:30, 4 September 2017 (UTC)

Kautilya3, I did not understand where exactly Noorani states that the Shahidulla fort was 'an obvious effort to create facts on the ground'. Please could you clarify how you arrived at this conclusion and added 'ostensible' again? The Discoverer (talk) 20:21, 4 September 2017 (UTC)

Do you see "the Darbar contended that Shahidulla was their frontier"? So, was it guard house for protecting caravans, or was it a border post? I must admit it is getting a bit tiresome discussing things here. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 20:35, 4 September 2017 (UTC)

I do not see how the statement "the Darbar contended that Shahidulla was their frontier" can be taken to mean that it was not a guard house. "was it guard house for protecting caravans, or was it a border post": Couldn't it have been both? Why are we going beyond the sources and casting aspersions that the sources do not cast? The Discoverer (talk) 06:40, 5 September 2017 (UTC)

No, in the normal sense of the word a "guard house" is not a frontier post, and it wasn't sold by the Maharaja as such in 1865. That is why it was an effort to create facts on the ground, and the term "ostensible" applies. This kind of game-playing continues between China and South Asia to the present day. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 09:56, 5 September 2017 (UTC)

And, to make the issue clearer, the content that is yet to come will point out that the Maharaja had only internal sovereignty. He could not extend his frontiers without British permission. -- Kautilya3 (talk)

W. H. Johnson

I have been trying to dig into W. H. Johnson's background and what he actually did. It turns out that all the innuendo we see among various sources (even respectable ones) were basically generated by Alastair Lamb and Neville Maxwell, neither of whom is a disinterested scholar. Parshotham Mehra has a well-received book on the history of the Aksai Chin frontier, which unfortunately I can't get hold of. But there are enough comments in this review^[1] to caste doubt on the received wisdom. Here is a quote:

Whatever the truth, Johnson’s personal integrity as well as his professional competence, were rated very highly among his contemporaries. The official report of the Great Trigonometrical Survey of India (1865-66) paid him rich encomiums. His explorations were viewed as being ’most valuable and important’, he was commended for the ’great energy and perseverence’ he had displayed, and saluted for being ’the first to give any account’ of these hitherto unknown regions. The Royal Geographical Society honoured Johnson in 1875 with a gold watch for his ’survey journey of 1865’. Drew, no mean surveyor himself, hailed Johnson for his survey and called him a ’bold and enduring traveller’.

Regarding the 'Johnson Line', he says:

Lall accepts that Johnson was but ’representing the situation in 1865’ when Turkestan was in revolt and the Shahidulla outpost was occupied by then Maharaja’s men: ’the fact remains that the actual north-eastern boundary was not known at the time.’ Years later in 1907 Younghusband was to underline another facet of this, namely, that the entire Aksai Chin lacked jurisdictional boundaries. On closer scrutiny it would thus appear that the real problem for Lall, as no doubt for Lamb was not so much why Johnson showed his boundary where he did 6ut-in the author’s own words-‘why the Johnson boundary continued to be shown in one transfrontier map after the other?’. Constraints of space do not permit a detailed explanation. Briefly, the answer is that barring some modifications and a short interregnum (1899-1912), the Raj, as well as its successors had broadly accepted Johnson’s alignment.

Except for the last line in italics, nothing else here is controversial.

On the whole, the conclusion is that there was nothing wrong with the Johnson Line when it appeared. It was unclaimed territory which could well be taken into Kashmir's jurisdiction. Johnson's reasons for claiming Aksai Chin were two (i) it offered a better logistical route to Shahidullah, which was already occupied by Kashmir (ii) it offered a good trade route into Turkestan. Neither the Chinese nor the Turkis were interested in it at that time and, in fact, at any time prior to 1950s.

Accordingly, I am going to remove all the innuendo on Johnson that has been placed here, and move it to the W. H. Johnson page, where it can be discussed in detail with all the different view points. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:58, 5 September 2017 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: Thanks for the thorough research you've done. However, I'm curious to find out why you consider Alastair Lamb and Neville Maxwell, two famous British/Australian scholars, as not disinterested, while you seem to think Parshotam Mehra, an Indian scholar, is disinterested? Does not seem logical to me. -Zanhe (talk) 22:25, 5 September 2017 (UTC)

On the strength of facts, citations and the reviews they receive. I take a good scholar as one whom the opponents cannot shoot down. Nationalities rarely matter to me, and they certainly don't matter to Wikipedia. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:45, 5 September 2017 (UTC)

Nationality does matter in shaping people's world views and in shaping others' perception of them. I'm not saying Parshotam Mehra is necessarily biased (not personally familiar with his work), but he's relatively unknown compared with established authorities such as Maxwell, Lamb, Allen Whiting, Larry Wortzel, etc. We as editors should follow academic consensus, not promote arguments that are not yet widely accepted, especially by scholars from an involved country. -Zanhe (talk) 01:03, 6 September 2017 (UTC)

You must be joking if you say there is scholarly consensus! I just quoted from an author published by Oxford University Press, which demolishes the arguments made by these authors (at least Lamb, Maxwell and Lall, I don't know about the others). That is not what is called "consensus". Reknown counts for little on Wikipedia. Reliability is what we care about. Authors published by University presses are considered the most reliable sources. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 01:19, 6 September 2017 (UTC)

No scholarly consensus is absolute, but Maxwell, Lamb, and Allen Whiting are as close as you can get (outside India, at least), and needless to say, all have been published by academic presses. See other scholars' assessments:

• Steven A. Hoffmann (1990): "[Maxwell] provided the most detailed and comprehensive treatment of the subject available for many years; and his views became widely accepted." (India and the China Crisis. University of California Press. p 3. ISBN 978-0-520-06537-6)
• John Garver (2006): "Succinctly stated, the orthodox scholarly view in this regard [China's Response to India's Forward Policy], established by Maxwell and Whiting" (New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy. ed. Alastair Johnston and Robert Ross. Stanford University Press. p. 103. ISBN 978-0-8047-5363-0)

Maxwell was also highly regarded by such giants as John K. Fairbank and AJP Taylor, although I don't have the sources handy right now. As a student of Asian history, I've yet to read any Western scholar who fundamentally disagrees with Maxwell and Whiting. -Zanhe (talk) 02:58, 6 September 2017 (UTC)

I am afraid you are talking at cross-purposes. Let us say, for the time being, that Maxwell is a reliable source. That does not mean that whatever he says has become "consensus". The very page 3 of Hoffman you have cited says, The two seemingly irreconcilable academic schools of thought still exist, and each finds adherents among statesmen and diplomats., which means, there is no consensus. So you need to drop this line of argument.

Secondly, W.H.Johnson, whom we are discussing here, was a 19th century surveyor. What happened in the 19th century is regarded as history, and we depend on WP:HISTRS (historians, trained in historical analysis) for such matters. Maxwell is not a reliable source for history. So you need to drop citing him as an authority for history too. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:00, 6 September 2017 (UTC)

I agree completely with Kautilya3. This belittling of Johnson and his line mainly begins in modern times (Lamb, Maxwell and so on). In several articles on Wikipedia while speaking about the Aksai Chin border dispute, only the possible motives of Johnson are discussed in order to discredit him, nothing is said about the motives of other 'line-makers' like Adgarh, MacDonald and Macartney. And Kautilya3 is not the first to notice this character assassination of Johnson. Therefore, I think we should remove all discussion of Johnson's motives and the alleged bias of his line from pages that deal with the border dispute and geographical topics. The different viewpoints can be juxtaposed and dealt with properly on the page W. H. Johnson. About Mehra, neither his nationality nor his difference of opinion with other scholars makes him an unreliable source. WP:BIASED states 'reliable sources are not required to be neutral, unbiased, or objective'. -- — Preceding unsigned comment added by The Discoverer (talk • contribs)

@The Discoverer: You were topic banned for POV pushing, misrepresentation of sources, etc. I've been away from Wikipedia a lot lately and don't know how your ban got lifted, but I'm not going to waste my time with a persistently tendentious and dishonest editor. -Zanhe (talk) 23:55, 6 September 2017 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: Neville Maxwell may have begun his career as a journalist, but he was also a scholar of the SOAS, University of London. He is highly regarded in academia and frequently published by academic presses. Even his critics (who are mostly from an Indian background) consider him a renowned scholar (e.g. Kishan Rana). So you need to stop attacking his credentials. As for Allen Whiting, Alastair Lamb, etc., they are also renowned scholars with impeccable credentials. That being said, nobody is infallible. If neutral, academic sources convincingly overturn an authoritative view, we should by all means update Wikipedia accordingly. But neutrality is essential. -Zanhe (talk) 23:48, 6 September 2017 (UTC)

Bibliography

• Maxwell, Neville (1970), India's China War, Pantheon Books, ISBN 978-0-394-47051-1
• Guruswamy, Mohan; Singh, Zorawar Daulet (2009), "The Legacy of the Great Game" (PDF), India China Relations: The Border Issue and Beyond, Viva Books, ISBN 978-81-309-1195-3
• Mehra, Parshotam (1992), An "agreed" frontier: Ladakh and India's northernmost borders, 1846-1947, Oxford University Press

• Lamb, Alastair (1964), The China-India border, Oxford University Press

While the main article has been substantially edited over the last year or so, some basic misconceptions seem to persist with a number of correspondents. About the "Background" that is basic to the entire issue, it is overlooked that till about the 17th century Tibet was largely independent and free from any overt Chinese control or suzerainty. The Mongols had equally invaded both China and Tibet in the 13th century as had the Manchus in the 17th century. After the Manchu empire collapsed in 1911, Tibet declared its independence in 1912, as did Mongolia. Nationalist China in 1912 and Communist China after 1949 continued to view Tibet as a subject country. All this has been amply documented by Prof. L. Petech in "China and Tibet in the Early 18th century", Dr. A. Lamb in "British India and Tibet: 1710-1910", Margaret Fisher and Leo Rose in "England, India, nepal, Tibet, China - A Syncronistic Table", Francis Watson in "The Frontiers of China" and other authorities. Who today recalls that British authorities deputed P. Vans Agnew and Alexander Cunningham as Boundary Commissioners in 1846 and invited the Tibetans and Chinese to lend a hand in demarcating the border, and again in 1947 with Strachey and Thomson? Or, who wants to recall that Mr. Ivan Chen, Ambassador Plenipotentiary of the Chinese Government, between October 1913 and April 1914 sat at the same table with Lochen Shatra, the Tibetan representative, at Simla to chalk out an agreed boundary? Obviously the context of a situation has to be carefully studied with relevant facts and documents to be able to get closer to the truth.Pidiji (talk) 02:22, 7 September 2017 (UTC)

Alex Shih, Capitals00 requested for page protection and then edited and removed text from the page: [7] and [8]. Please protect a version of the page that had consensus, such as the version from 5 September or an earlier version. The Discoverer (talk) 08:56, 9 September 2017 (UTC)

Forget any "consensus", as none of your edits were discussed, they had too many errors and misrepresentation of sources. Since you are de facto topic banned from this subject before, you should be more cautious. Capitals00 (talk) 12:37, 9 September 2017 (UTC)

See this breakdown of the removed text that shows that it was well referenced. The Discoverer (talk) 12:45, 9 September 2017 (UTC)

That's doesn't show any "consensus", only shows that you didn't wanted removal of the misrepresentation of sources and info that you presented. Capitals00 (talk) 14:09, 9 September 2017 (UTC)

Capitals00, you cited Okoth as a source for 'status quo' in the article, then repeated this claim twice on the talk page: [9] and [10]. When asked to substantiate this claim, you are unable to do so. Who is misrepresenting sources? The Discoverer (talk) 16:38, 9 September 2017 (UTC)

It says that China had already occupied Aksai Chin, on page 97. It doesn't say that China occupied anything more as result of the war, but "still" occupied what it had before the war. Capitals00 (talk) 16:57, 9 September 2017 (UTC)

This source (Okoth) has not attributed these claims properly. According to the original source of this information, it is "According to Indian records, China was in illegal possession of 37,500 square km (14,500 square miles) of Indian territory to the northeast of Kashmir. And the Chinese claim that India was occupying 129,000 square km (50,000 square miles)," in 1962. So if The Discover is saying that China achieved 14,500 square miles of territory as result of war, he should also say that India achieved 50,000 square miles. Other sources have highlighted both these claims, like [11] and concludes "resulted in a stalemate". D4iNa4 (talk) 17:11, 9 September 2017 (UTC)

@Capitals00, regarding your statement that "It says that China had already occupied Aksai Chin, on page 97", there is only one instance of the word 'occupy' on page 97, and that sentence says this: "From 1958 onwards, they (the Chinese) began to occupy parts of Indian territory through clandestine invasions of remote areas." Either this is yet another instance of misrepresentation by you, or it demonstrates a sincere belief on your part that Aksai Chin is, after all, Indian territory. The Discoverer (talk) 18:29, 9 September 2017 (UTC)

With this WP:IDHT tendency, you can't resolve the dispute. You have misrepresented sources and you believe that only Indian claim on Aksai Chin matters, not Chinese claim on Arunachal Pradesh. Deceptively editing when editors are not looking and claiming it to be "consensus" version is nothing but disruptive editing, for which you have been topic banned before. Capitals00 (talk) 01:46, 11 September 2017 (UTC)

•  Comment: I will take a look at this tomorrow morning when I wake up. Alex Shih^Talk 18:26, 10 September 2017 (UTC)