Talk:Knowledge

Former featured article candidateKnowledge is a former featured article candidate. Please view the links under Article milestones below to see why the nomination failed. For older candidates, please check the archive.
Good articleKnowledge has been listed as one of the Philosophy and religion good articles under the good article criteria. If you can improve it further, please do so. If it no longer meets these criteria, you can reassess it.
Did You Know Article milestones
DateProcessResult
October 30, 2022Peer reviewReviewed
March 9, 2023Good article nomineeListed
January 23, 2024Peer reviewReviewed
April 2, 2024Featured article candidateNot promoted
Did You Know A fact from this article appeared on Wikipedia's Main Page in the "Did you know?" column on March 20, 2023.
The text of the entry was: Did you know ... that it is controversial whether knowledge is the same as justified true belief?
Current status: Former featured article candidate, current good article

Untitled

This article covers many aspects of knowledge. For the philosophical areas of knowledge please use epistemology.

Wrong knowledge is still knowledge

"Complementary to the sociology of knowledge is the sociology of ignorance[1] including the study of nescience, ignorance, knowledge gaps or non-knowledge as inherent features of knowledge making."[2] [3] [4]

References

  1. ^ http://www.sociologyofignorance.com The Sociology of Ignorance
  2. ^ Beck, Ulrich; Wehling, Peter (2012). Rubio, F.D.; Baert, P. (eds.). The politics of non-knowing: An emerging area of social and political conflict in reflexive modernity. New York: Routledge. pp. 33–57. ISBN 0415497108.
  3. ^ Gross, Matthias (2010). Ignorance and Surprise: Science, Society, and Ecological Design. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ISBN 9780262013482.
  4. ^ Moore, Wilbert; Tumin, Melvin (1949). "Some social functions of ignorance". American Sociological Review. 14 (6): 787–796. doi:10.2307/2086681.

Did you know nomination

The following is an archived discussion of the DYK nomination of the article below. Please do not modify this page. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page (such as this nomination's talk page, the article's talk page or Wikipedia talk:Did you know), unless there is consensus to re-open the discussion at this page. No further edits should be made to this page.

The result was: promoted by Bruxton (talk) 17:29, 14 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]

(
  • Comment or view
  • Article history
)
  • ... that it is controversial whether knowledge is the same as justified true belief? Source: Zagzebski, Linda (1999). "What Is Knowledge?". In Greco, John; Sosa, Ernest (eds.). The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 92–116. doi:10.1002/9781405164863.ch3. ISBN 9780631202905. OCLC 39269507. S2CID 158886670. Since believing is something a person does, beliefs have customarily been treated as analogous to acts, so beliefs are good in the sense in which acts are right. Right believing has traditionally been identified with justified believing. So knowledge is justified true belief (JTB ). Sometimes, but not always, this has been understood to mean true belief for the right reasons. For several decades the concept of justification has received an enormous amount of attention since it was assumed that the JTB definition of knowledge was more or less accurate and that the concept of justification was the weak link in the definition. For the most part these discussions proceeded under the assumption that the aim was to arrive at a necessary truth and that the method to be used in doing so was that of truth condition analysis. An important set of counterexamples to the JTB definition of knowledge were proposed by Edmund Gettier (1963) and led to many attempts at refining the definition without questioning either the purpose or the method of definition. ... Gettier's examples are cases in which a belief is true and justified, but it is not an instance of knowledge because it is only by chance that the belief is true.
    • ALT1: ... that philosophers distinguish knowledge of facts from knowledge-how and knowledge by acquaintance? Source: Lilley, Simon; Lightfoot, Geoffrey; Amaral, Paulo (2004). Representing Organization: Knowledge, Management, and the Information Age. Oxford University Press. pp. 162–3. ISBN 978-0-19-877541-6. In its more modern forms epistemology has taken the analysis of meaning and the status of claims to knowledge as its quarry. Consequently, writers such as Bertrand Arthur William Russell (also known as the third Earl Russell, 1872-1970), George Edward Moore (1873-1958), and Ludwig Joseph Johann Wittgenstein (1889-1951) have attempted to delineate three kinds of knowledge: 1. Knowledge that, or 'factual knowledge' ... 2. Knowledge how, or 'practical knowledge' ... 3. Knowledge of people, places, and things, or 'knowledge by acquaintance'
    • Reviewed: (first DYK submission)

Improved to Good Article status by Phlsph7 (talk). Self-nominated at 13:31, 10 March 2023 (UTC). Post-promotion hook changes for this nom will be logged at Template talk:Did you know nominations/Knowledge; consider watching this nomination, if it is successful, until the hook appears on the Main Page.[reply]

General: Article is new enough and long enough
Policy: Article is sourced, neutral, and free of copyright problems
Hook: Hook has been verified by provided inline citation
QPQ: Done.
Overall: @Phlsph7: Good article. Onegreatjoke (talk) 20:21, 10 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Article needs more interdisciplinary perspective (cut-and-paste from FAC review)

I share this again here because the FAC review is quite long and more folks will see this here than will read anything in the archives there. I cite only myself. If for any reason this is not appropriate, please revert on your own authority and explain on my talk page. I'm only sharing what I think might help improve the article.

At this stage, I am mostly (if not completely) satisfied that the article does everything that it accepts as within its scope at the FA level. I am entirely unsatisfied, however, with respect to what I take to be the arbitrary and artificial restriction of this scope to (for the most part) the concerns of analytic epistemology. To elaborate:

  • In a response yesterday, with reference to R. J. Bernstein's presentation of pragmatism, I made the case that analytic philosophy cannot be accepted as the philosophical authority on knowledge; there is another family of theories that must also be covered. I believe, at minimum, that this requires its own subsection as a definition.
  • I think that, in addition to a section addressing my concerns in the prior bullet, the Definitions section should have as its first subsection something about the "knowledge-how" to, for instance, walk and converse in a natural language. Way more people (basically everyone who has had a baby) care way more about this than they do about anything professional philosophers have to say about anything. I am sure that developmental psychologists, pediatricians, and other researchers in this area use a different terminology than philosophers, but this should still be included with relevant wikilinks if for no other reason than this sort of knowledge is the precondition for all of the other more sophisticated sorts of knowledge discussed in the body of the article.
  • I am embarrassed to have missed this until now, but how is there no discussion of knowledge of what is right, what is moral, what is just, how best to live, et cetera? Someone writing an overview of analytic epistemology can excuse themselves from addressing such issues on the ground that these issues are better discussed under the separate heading of metaethics. A general article on knowledge, however, cannot take recourse to such an artificial excuse.
  • I continue to believe that individual self-knowledge deserves its own section. Even if this is not reflected in the indices of non-philosophical sources in the terms a philosopher would prefer, this is a huge issue in the psychotheraputic project. A section on this would also provide an opportunity to briefly discuss knowledge of others. It is a not uncommon theme in modern and contemporary literature and film that a protagonist discovers that they don't "really" know their spouse, or that they never "truly" knew a deceased friend or relative. So this could also be a nice occasion to mention the knowledge afforded by narrative art (even though I do not believe that this should be required for FA status).
  • I still think that a FA on knowledge needs a section on the various ways that apparently neutral or objective knowledge is sometimes anything but. I concede, however, that I have not made a knock-down case for the inclusion of anything specific. I'm not going to make any non-minor edits to the article while it is under FAC review. If, however, you would like me to edit what little is included about Foucault, I would be happy to do so—subject (of course!) to reversion, should anything be deemed for any reason not an improvement to the article.

In my first post to this discussion, I expressed considerable reservations (or, if you prefer, outright confusion) over what might constitute a "comprehensive" treatment of such a general issue. It has come to my attention, however, that there is an emerging consensus to replace this language with what is already policy elsewhere in terms of being unlikely to benefit from further additions.

I believe, however, that this article would benefit a great deal from the attention of editors approaching it from the perspectives of developmental psychology, speech or physical therapy, or pedagogy—among, I am sure, many other relevant disciplines. This is actually what I would most like to see.

Don't be shy about pinging me about any of the above that you would like to work on, but upon which you would be interested in further context from me. By default, however, I would encourage everyone to just be WP:BOLD!

Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 00:14, 6 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]

This is just to check in and test the water; for I'm not sure when I might actually get to this, even if it finds support. But how would involved editors feel about me creating sections on probably the following areas: something from pragmatism and hermeneutics for the Definitions section, a new section on psychological self-knowledge, and a section on knowledge of norms/ethics/morality/right? If I were to do this, I would cite everything to high-quality sources, but (with the possible exception of the first) could not make any claim to an appropriate level of comprehensiveness. (It would be a small research project on my part, but I might also be willing to see what I might be able to turn up in the literature on developmental psychology to supply a stub section on basic knowledge-how such as walking and talking, also for the Definitions section.)
The idea would be to create space in the structure of the article that might invite more knowledgeable folks to make small, incremental contributions without having to take on a whole project. I think this could help to improve the article along the lines of the FAC results, but such underdeveloped sections could also jeopardize GA status, which I have no desire to do.
Thoughts, comments, suggestions (as always!) most welcome —
Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 02:44, 7 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The main danger I see is WP:UNDUEWEIGHT since wide-scope articles like this one shouldn't have sections on every single philosophical tradition. As discussed here, this type of decision should be based on the weight given to the topics in overview sources. The overview sources that I'm aware of don't support these additions. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:21, 7 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I was only offering out of a sense of obligation after having pressed for them during the FAC. So I will happily take this as a free pass to leave the work to others.
Also, since it wasn't promoted due to doubts about the adequacy of its governing overview sources, I'm not sure why you're bringing them up in this context. Multiple editors agreed that the article would benefit from additional perspectives, notwithstanding the impressively high-standard at which it covers what it does.
Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 17:26, 7 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
@PatrickJWelsh: If you want to add something from pragmatism and hermeneutics, consider adding it to Definitions of knowledge; the "Other definitions" section there starts with a short paragraph on pragmatism. That article is linked in a couple of places in this article.
Note that there is already an article on Self-knowledge (psychology). I'm not sure why that article is not linked at the first occurrence of "self-knowledge" in this article, in the first paragraph of Knowledge § Others, which is a paragraph about self-knowledge. Did you overlook that paragraph, or is there some reason why you think the article needs a new paragraph on self-knowledge?
Regarding your wish to have a section on knowledge of norms/ethics/morality/right, you said: Someone writing an overview of analytic epistemology can excuse themselves from addressing such issues on the ground that these issues are better discussed under the separate heading of metaethics. A general article on knowledge, however, cannot take recourse to such an artificial excuse. I don't understand why this would be an artificial excuse. I think it's perfectly reasonable to cover this subject in the Moral epistemology section of Metaethics. I would want to see some overview sources that treat moral knowledge as an important category of knowledge to justify including such a section in this article.
By the way, note that there is an article on Epistemic cognition, about the psychological study of "people's beliefs regarding the characteristics of knowledge and knowing". I mention that because you are interested in developmental psychology. Biogeographist (talk) 18:42, 7 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Hi @Biogeographist,
Thanks for the response! If I add something about pragmatism and/or hermeneutics, it would be as another definition. (Noticed just before posting that your suggestion was actually to add it to another article, not the first section of this one.) The reason I propose such an addition is that I think the article is too quick to accept propositional knowledge as the paradigm case of knowledge. This is appropriately qualified elsewhere in the article, but at present the lead and the first section of the article are concerned almost exclusively with propositional knowledge. If that is the kind about which there is the most to say, I have no problem with the article giving it the most attention. I would just like the article to start from a broader perspective and then narrow in focus (in whatever way is determined to be most appropriate).
I did not overlook the paragraph on self-knowledge in Others, and I have no problem with it as a concise account from a philosophical perspective (as it is explicitly presented). What I am suggesting would improve the article would be an account from a more psychological perspective, that is, something addressing the challenges of knowing one's own individual self. I am not, however, qualified to write on this.
With respect to the normative stuff, I agree that it does not belong in an epistemology article. But I think there is a strong case that it should be addressed by an article on knowledge in general. With respect to the use of overview sources for articles of extreme generality, you might have a look at this discussion, initiated by Phlsph7, in case you have not already noticed it. I'm not sure it's going to result in any sort of generalizable consensus, but quite a few folks have chimed in from various perspectives. On this specific issue, however, I do believe there should be discussion before any attempt at implementation.
All that said, in the absence of a consensus, I am going to hold off on any major edits in order to avoid even the appearance of having opposed the nomination in order to impose my own views on the article. I am re-following, however, to participate in any further discussion that might emerge.
Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 19:21, 8 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Biologically primary/secondary knowledge

Something that PatrickJWelsh said in the FAC review text above may point to an important distinction not yet covered in this article. Patrick said: the Definitions section should have as its first subsection something about the "knowledge-how" to, for instance, walk and converse in a natural language. Way more people (basically everyone who has had a baby) care way more about this.

In cognitive load theory, the abilities that you mention here are called "biologically primary knowledge", e.g.: "We deal quite differently with biologically primary and biologically secondary information. Recognising faces, recognising speech, using general problem-solving strategies, and engaging in basic social relations provide examples of biologically primary knowledge that we have evolved to acquire."[1] I'm not so sure that people "care way more" about this kind of knowledge as opposed to what cognitive load theory calls biologically secondary knowledge. I imagine that most people are concerned with the latter unless their kids are failing to acquire the former. But your comment raises the very apposite issue that it may be worth mentioning the biologically primary/secondary distinction in this article, in Knowledge § Others. Biogeographist (talk) 18:42, 7 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks for the link. This is indeed the sort of thing I had in mind. You are also right to question "care way more". What I meant, but did not write, is that it matters the most inasmuch as it is the sort of foundational knowledge upon which other more developed forms depend.
For the reasons stated in my previous post (i.e., avoiding the assumption that propositional knowledge is paradigmatic), I would prefer it appear as a short, one-paragraph definition near the top of the article. But I agree that it would also fit in Others.
Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 19:29, 8 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for the suggestion, I added a short explanation to the section "Others". Phlsph7 (talk) 07:26, 9 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ Sweller, John; Ayres, Paul L.; Kalyuga, Slava (2011). "Categories of knowledge: an evolutionary approach". Cognitive load theory. Explorations in the learning sciences, instructional systems and performance technologies. New York: Springer. p. 3. doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-8126-4_1. ISBN 9781441981257. OCLC 704381873.

Foucault

Hi @Ceoil, would you mind elaborating your justification for this[1] revert? I dropped the matter during the FAC review, but as written it misrepresents Foucault's basic position (especially when juxtaposed with the preceding sentence). For instance, from the SEP article:

On Foucault’s account, the relation of power and knowledge is far closer than in the familiar Baconian engineering model, for which “knowledge is power” means that knowledge is an instrument of power, although the two exist quite independently. Foucault’s point is rather that, at least for the study of human beings, the goals of power and the goals of knowledge cannot be separated: in knowing we control and in controlling we know.

Thanks! Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 23:33, 6 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Your additions were overly verbose and added little...."the nature of"..."examined what he analyzed"..."By way of"?? Ceoil (talk) 23:39, 6 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Perhaps consider restoring the change and editing for clarity? Otherwise, if this is your only objection, I will probably revert and make an effort to do so myself. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 00:22, 7 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The onus should be on the editor introducing old fashioned and tortured prose. Ceoil (talk) 00:30, 7 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Not really sure how to respond to that, but I will restore my edit and then attempt to reword in a more accessible (modern?) prose style. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 00:45, 7 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
If I understand it correctly, the change is based on the claim that the original passage misrepresents Foucault. I don't see how the sentence quoted above supports this claim since our formulation is rather vague and does not mention Bacon. One simple solution could be to restore the original formulation and replace the phrase the extent to which knowledge is power with whether knowledge is power or the extent to which knowledge and power are intertwined or something similar. I assume this would solve Patrick's concern while also addressing the prose concern. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:54, 7 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
"Knowledge is power" is something you tell kids to try to get them more interested in school. I imagine that it is also frequently repeated in some business classes. Foucault's point, however, is not just that power and knowledge are entwined, but that they follow a "logic" (my word, not his) independent of any human intention at any level, individual or institutional. I don't think this is captured by your original formulation or the slightly modified version here. It is, however, supported by the SEP article. Go ahead though and revert if you want. I've spent too much time on this in the review, and am tired of debating it at sentence level. Please tag me should you want any further input (though I imagine you have had more than enough!). I'm unfollowing for at least the time being.
Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 17:47, 7 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
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