China–Kyrgyzstan relations

China–Kyrgyzstan relations
Map indicating locations of China and Kyrgyzstan

China

Kyrgyzstan

China–Kyrgyzstan relations are the bilateral relationship between China and Kyrgyzstan.

History

As of 1996, relations between Kyrgyzstan and China were an area of substantial uncertainty for the government in Bishkek.[1] The free-trade zone in Naryn attracted large numbers of Chinese businesspeople, who came to dominate most of the republic's import and export of small goods.[1] Most of this trade is in barter conducted by ethnic Kyrgyz or Kazakhs who are Chinese citizens.[1] The Kyrgyz government had expressed alarm over the numbers of Chinese who were moving into Naryn and other parts of Kyrgyzstan, but no preventive measures had been taken as of 1996.[1]

Migration

The Chinese border crossing at the Torugart Pass on the road between Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) and Kashgar (Xinjiang)

Relations between the two nations are hindered by the fact that China does not want the independence of Kyrgyzstan, a Turkic state, to encourage Turkic inhabitants of China's Xinjiang province to pursue their own independence.[1] There is some anti-Uyghur sentiment in Kyrgyzstan. Daniar Usenov, who became the Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan in 2009, received accolades from multiple Kyrgyzstan newspapers by articulating the fear in 1999 that Kyrgyzstan would become "Uygurstan" through an alleged Chinese plot of miscegenation.[2] Kyrgyzstan refused to permit the formation of a Uyghur party.[1]

Trade

Inside Bishkek's gigantic Dordoy Bazaar, filled primarily with Chinese products

Since the 1990s, trade with China grew enormously.[1] Particularly important is the re-export of Chinese consumer goods to the neighboring Uzbekistan (mostly via Karasuu Bazar at Kara-Suu, Osh Province) and to Kazakhstan and Russia (mostly via Dordoy Bazaar in Bishkek).[3] Due to its linguistic and cultural affinity with the Chinese (particularly, Hui) people, Kyrgyzstan's small Dungan community plays a significant role in the trade. In some political quarters, the prospect of Chinese domination stimulated nostalgia for the days of Moscow's control.[1]

As of 2019, China is one of the main trade and economic partners of Kyrgyzstan. In 2022, China accounted for 37% of Kyrgyzstan's total trade, far eclipsing other countries.[4] China is also the main bilateral creditor of Kyrgyzstan. Their economic relationship is highly asymmetrical as "[w]hile for China the bilateral projects in Kyrgyzstan are small, they are significant for Kyrgyzstan".[5]

Kyrgyzstan is active in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), viewing the BRI as an opportunity to increase inbound foreign direct investment, modernize its transportation infrastructure, and build better connections with Europe and China.[6]: 216 

Territorial claims

China had historically claimed large tracts of Kyrgyzstan's territory, encompassing almost the whole of the country. According to Chinese historians, in the second half of the 19th century, China's Qing dynasty was forced to enter into a number of unequal treaties in which Kyrgyz lands, particularly the North Kyrgyz lands, were ceded to the Russian Empire in 1863.[7]

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan and the two other Central Asian republics bordering the People's Republic of China inherited the border disputes that the USSR and PRC had themselves inherited from the Russian and Qing Empires.[8] In 1996, the two countries signed their first border treaty. It was ratified in 1998.[9] That first treaty demarcated approximately 900 km of the countries' 1,011 km of shared border.[9] A second border agreement was signed in 1999 by Chinese president Jiang Zemin and Kyrgyzstan's president Askar Akaev.[9] In that agreement, China received 90,000 hectares in the Uzengi-Kuush region in exchange for Kyrgyzstan receiving two-thirds of Khan Tengri peak and Victory Peak.[9]

Security and military cooperation

The security situation in Kyrgyzstan has been of great concern to China, not only because of the issue over the Uyghurs, but also due to problems with narcotic trafficking.[10] During the 2005 Tulip Revolution China considered developments in Kyrgyzstan so important that they raised the possibility of deploying combat forces.[10]

Kyrgyzstan and China have concluded joint military exercises several times. Kyrgyzstan has participated in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation's series of joint military exercises (titled "Peace Mission") several times, alongside Russia, China, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan. Kyrgyzstan participated in the 2010, 2012, and 2014 exercises. Kyrgyzstan has also participated in the SCO's "anti-terrorist exercises" with China and other SCO countries, doing so first in 2002 and subsequently in 2003, 2006, and 2010.[11]

Kyrgyzstan adheres to the one China principle and supports China's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.[12]

See also

Further reading

  • Cardenal, Juan Pablo; Araújo, Heriberto (2011). La silenciosa conquista china (in Spanish). Barcelona: Crítica. p. 81. ISBN 9788498922578.

References

  1. ^ a b c d e f g h Martha Brill Olcott. "Central Asian Neighbors". Kyrgyzstan: a country study (Glenn E. Curtis, editor). Library of Congress Federal Research Division (March 1996). This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
  2. ^ Megoran, Nick (2004). "The critical geopolitics of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley boundary dispute, 1999-2000". Political Geography. 23 (6): 731–764. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2004.03.004.
  3. ^ Sebastien Peyrouse, Economic Aspects of China-Central Asia Rapprochment Archived 2009-02-07 at the Wayback Machine. Central Asia - Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program. 2007. p.18.
  4. ^ Gizitdinov, Nariman (6 June 2023). "China Edging Out Russia as Sanctions Redraw Kazakhstan Trade". Bloomberg News. Retrieved 7 June 2023.
  5. ^ Vakulchuk, Roman and Indra Overland (2019) “China’s Belt and Road Initiative through the Lens of Central Asia”, in Fanny M. Cheung and Ying-yi Hong (eds) Regional Connection under the Belt and Road Initiative. The Prospects for Economic and Financial Cooperation. London: Routledge, p. 122.
  6. ^ Gerstl, Alfred (2023). "China in its Immediate Neighborhood". In Kironska, Kristina; Turscanyi, Richard Q. (eds.). Contemporary China: a New Superpower?. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-03-239508-1.
  7. ^ "China Kyrgyzstan Relations" (PDF). Hacettepe University Institute of Social Sciences. 30 July 2020.
  8. ^ Peyrouse, Sebastien (2016). "China and Central Asia". The new great game : China and South and Central Asia in the era of reform. Thomas Fingar. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. p. 218. ISBN 978-0-8047-9764-1. OCLC 939553543.
  9. ^ a b c d Peyrouse, Sebastien (2016). "China and Central Asia". The new great game : China and South and Central Asia in the era of reform. Thomas Fingar. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. p. 220. ISBN 978-0-8047-9764-1. OCLC 939553543.
  10. ^ a b China, US, Russia eye Bishkek
  11. ^ Richard Weitz, Parsing Chinese-Russian Military Exercises, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College (April 2015).
  12. ^ Michel, Casey (2016-06-21). "Only One China for Kyrgyzstan: Bishkek Rejects Taiwanese NGO". The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 2023-03-29.
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