Berlin Conference (March 26-27, 1917)

Berlin Conference
(March 26–27, 1917)

Entrance hall of the Reich Foreign Office.
Date	March 26–27, 1917 (1917-03-26 – 1917-03-27)
Location	Berlin
Type	Strategy meeting
Participants	Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg Arthur Zimmermann Ottokar Czernin Alexander Graf von Hoyos
Outcome	Definition of a new war aims program of the Quadruple Alliance.[Note 1]

The Berlin Conference of March 26–27, 1917 was the second governmental meeting between Arthur Zimmermann and Ottokar Czernin, the German and Austro-Hungarian foreign ministers, under the chairmanship of Reich Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg. The meeting was intended to define the war aims of the Imperial Reich^{[Note 2]} and the Dual Monarchy, and to prepare for the first official meeting between German Emperor Wilhelm II and the new Emperor-King Charles I.^{[Note 3]} At a time when changes in political personnel were taking place in the Dual Monarchy, which was becoming increasingly exhausted by the protracted conflict, this meeting was the first sign of disagreement between the two allies over the conditions for ending the conflict.

Context

The Central Powers and the Russian Revolution

The February Revolution temporarily put an end to military operations on the Eastern Front; however, the Russian provisional government's decision to remain loyal to the alliances concluded by the imperial regime obliged the Reich and its allies to keep a large number of divisions on the ground to face the Russian troops.

Differences in interpretation of the events in Russia quickly became a gulf of incomprehension between the Reich and the Dual Monarchy. Austro-Hungarian officials interpreted the Russian revolutionary events of February as a desire for peace; moreover, faced with a tense domestic situation, both the German and Austro-Hungarian civilian populations could aspire to a revolution, a possible prelude to a rapid end to the conflict.^[1]

However, despite the new Russian government's determination to continue the war, the revolution and the resulting turmoil meant that the Russian Army's operational capabilities were temporarily lost; aware of this reality, the military planners of the Reich and the Dual Monarchy quickly redeployed part of their armies then engaged on the Eastern Front to Italy, the Balkans and the West.^[2][3]

War aims of the Quadruple Alliance

In response to an official German request made on October 18, 1916, Stephan Burián von Rajecz, then Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, sent a note to his Quadruple allies on November 5, 1916, in which he specified the war aims of the Dual Monarchy, in search of an "increase in power and security."^[4]

In the days that followed, the Reich ambassadors posted in Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire sent the Bulgarian and Ottoman governments requests for clarification on the matter of war aims. Differences of opinion centered on the Bulgarian annexations and the compensation to be granted to the Ottomans and Austro-Hungarians.^{[Note 4][5]}

On January 1, 1917, the Imperial Chancellor, informed of these various programs, published the conditions for an equitable peace for the Reich government. The result of a compromise between civilians and the military, this program called for the annexation of the territories occupied by the Reich in Courland and Lithuania, the reconstitution of a Kingdom of Poland closely controlled by the Reich, the annexation of the mining fields of French Lorraine and Belgium, and the return of the German colonies then occupied by the Allies.^[6]

Divergences between the Allies

The accession of Charles I in December 1916 did not seem to alter the Dual Monarchy's management of the war, keen as it was to put an end to Austro-Hungarian involvement in the conflict. Nevertheless, Charles did change the Dual Monarchy's policy towards the Reich, no longer rallying unconditionally to German aspirations.^[7][8]

This aspiration to change the terms of the alliance between the Reich and the Dual Monarchy was reflected in Emperor-King Charles's desire to conclude a compromise peace with the Allies, based on the status quo; this political change appeared necessary in the eyes of the monarch and his entourage, aware of the general decay of the Dual Monarchy at the end of 30 months of conflict.^[9][10]

To negotiate the compromise peace desired by the Austro-Hungarian monarch, emissaries were sent to Switzerland in early February 1917 to meet diplomats representing neutral states; these meetings were intended to restore relations with France, which were initially informal and discreet. In reality, however, the Dual Monarchy negotiators were maneuvered by Matthias Erzberger and Georg von Hertling, then Minister-President of the Kingdom of Bavaria, both of whom supported the continuation of the war until the Reich had won.^[11][12]

Negotiators

The conference met at the Reich Foreign Ministry headquarters in Berlin.

The meeting was chaired by Reich Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, assisted by State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Arthur Zimmermann;^{[Note 5]} the Chancellor and his State Secretary were advised by their principal collaborators.^[13]

Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Ottokar Czernin^{[Note 6]} represented the Dual Monarchy. The Austro-Hungarian delegation includes the Minister's new Chief of Cabinet, Alexander Hoyos,^{[Note 7]} as well as Ladislas Müller von Szentgyörgyi, Head of Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.^{[Note 8][13]}

Discussions

Faced with a representative of an ally increasingly exhausted by the protracted conflict, the Imperial Chancellor imposed the political objectives pursued by the Reich on his Austro-Hungarian interlocutor.

The Reich, key player in the quadruple alliance

In the exchanges between the Reich Chancellor and the Austro-Hungarian Minister, Theobald von Bethamnn Hollweg imposed German objectives on his Austro-Hungarian interlocutor, despite the appearance of an alliance between equal partners. The small number of real concessions obtained by the Austro-Hungarian minister was further proof of the increasingly asymmetrical nature of the alliance between the Reich and the Dual Monarchy, putting the empire of the Hohenzollerns in a position to replace the empire of the Habsburgs, gradually ousting them from its political and economic positions in the Balkans and Eastern Europe.^[12][14]

However, at the beginning of 1917, the new Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister tried once again to convince the Reich Chancellor of the need to compromise on the conditions for ending the conflict. Despite the fact that the balance of power with the Dual Monarchy was largely in his favor, the importance of the Reich's positions must be put into perspective. Czernin succeeded in negotiating a minimal framework for defining the war aims pursued by the two allies; this minimal program remained vague, however, allowing for wide-ranging interpretations on both sides.^[15]

Sharing conquests

The distribution of territories conquered by the Quadruple Alliance since the outbreak of hostilities was also an issue in the relationship between the Reich and the Dual Monarchy at the beginning of 1917.^[16]

Discussions quickly focused on the need for a balance to be established between the "respective military results achieved by the two powers" and the devolution of conquests to one or other of the empires; at the same time, Czernin was in favor of setting up a "pool" in order to delay as long as possible the question of the final devolution of conquests from the Reich and its allies.^[17][18]

However, in the course of exchanges between the two parties, Czernin succeeded in convincing the Chancellor of the necessity of Romania's return to the Austro-Hungarian sphere of influence, in exchange for the cession of the Kingdom of Poland to the Reich: the kingdom's territory was thus promised to be shared between Russia and the Dual Monarchy, with the Siret marking the border between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian zones of influence. The status of the regions promised to Austria-Hungary had not yet been definitively determined, as the Austro-Hungarians vacillated between outright annexation or the establishment of a puppet monarchy, with the crown vested in an archduke of the Habsburg family.^[15][19]

Maintaining the Reich's war aims

In a global context marked by the cessation of operations on the Eastern Front and the importance of German armies in the Austro-German alliance,^{[Note 9]} the Reich Chancellor claimed victory for Germany in this theater of operations. However, there was less and less certainty that the Reich and its allies would be victorious in the prolonged conflict.^[14]

For this reason, the German representative opposed any "white peace" (i.e. without winners or losers) or any form of compromise with the Allies. On March 11, fifteen days before the conference with Czernin, Bethmann Hollweg defined the Reich's main war aims in front of his close advisors, with the aim of giving the Reich the means to become a true world power: the Chancellor proposed to bring the Reich closer to its immediate neighbors, Belgium, Poland and the Habsburg monarchy.^[14][20]

Conflict exit conditions

In a context marked by the weakening of military pressure on the Eastern Front, the Germans Bethmann-Hollweg, Zimmermann and the Austro-Hungarian Czernin defined the minimum conditions under which the German Empire and the Dual Monarchy declared their readiness to leave the conflict.

In the eyes of the German ministers, the end of the conflict should, in the worst-case scenario, allow a return to the status quo ante bellum, including the restitution of the German colonial empire.^{[Note 10]} However, aware that the balance of power was increasingly in the Allies' favor, Bethmann-Hollweg tried to convince the Dioscuri, Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff,^{[Note 11]} who had asserted themselves in the spring and summer of 1917 as the true holders of political power in the Reich, of the need to open compromise peace talks with the Allies. Disappointed, the latter considered forcing Wilhelm II, increasingly confined to a decorative role, to resign as Chancellor.^[13][14]

For Austro-Hungary, the territorial integrity of the Dual Monarchy was, at the end of the winter of 1916-1917, the main goal of the war.^{[Note 12]} For Czernin, the return of the occupied Austrian provinces was a non-negotiable objective, even if it had to be paid for by abandoning Austro-Hungarian ambitions in Poland.^[16]

Outcome

The March 27 protocol

The Berlin Conference of March 26–27, 1917 provided the opportunity to draw up a single set of minutes covering the partial advances negotiated on the Conference of Vienna (16 March 1917) [fr] as no minutes had been drawn up on March 16.^[15]

The Reich Chancellor took part in the drafting of this protocol, but seems not to have informed either the Dioscuri, Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, nor the Reich Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Arthur Zimmermann; similarly, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg did not inform Georg Michaelis, his successor at the Chancellery, of the existence of this document.^[17]

This document defines the conditions for ending the conflict in a flexible way, and divides the European conquests of the Quadruple Alliance between the Reich, the Dual Monarchy and Bulgaria; the means deployed by each of the three states in the quest for victory should constitute the key to dividing the conquests between the three allies, thus favoring the Reich and the Dual Monarchy over Bulgaria.^[17]

German divergence

The results of the preparatory talks between the Germans and Austro-Hungarians gave rise to intense debate among German civil and military leaders; indeed, the extent of the concessions granted to the Dual Monarchy by the Reich Chancellor and his key collaborators prompted the Dioscuri to regard the German-Austro-Hungarian agreements of March as a "capitulation" by the Reich to the Dual Monarchy. In their view, the agreement did not reflect the reality of the German war effort, and resulted in a shift in the balance of power in favor of Austria-Hungary, exhausted by shortages and human and material losses, while the greater part of the Quadruple Alliance's war effort fell on the Reich and its economy, as the military were quick to point out.^[17][21]

This approach to the conflict and the redefinition of the Reich's role prompted the Dioscuri and imperialist circles to demand that the Chancellor define a new program of war aims for the Reich and its allies.^[21]

See also

• Oberste Heeresleitung
• History of Austria-Hungary during World War I
• Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg
• Ottokar Czernin
• Germany's Aims in the First World War
• Mitteleuropa
• Berlin Conference (November 2-6, 1917)

Notes

References

Bibliography

• Bled, Jean-Paul (2014). L'Agonie d'une monarchie : Autriche-Hongrie 1914-1920 (in French). Paris: Tallandier. ISBN 979-10-210-0440-5.
• Fischer, Fritz (1970). Les Buts de guerre de l'Allemagne impériale [Germany's Aims in the First World War] (in French). Paris: Trévise.
• Lacroix-Riz, Annie; et al. (Références Histoire) (1996). Le Vatican, l'Europe et le Reich : De la Première Guerre mondiale à la guerre froide (in French). Paris: Armand Colin. ISBN 978-2-200-21641-2. OCLC 716491999.
• Renouvin, Pierre; et al. (Peuples et civilisations (N° 19)) (1934). La Crise européenne et la Première Guerre mondiale (in French). Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
• Soutou, Georges-Henri; et al. (Nouvelles études historiques) (1989). L'Or et le sang : Les Buts de guerre économiques de la Première Guerre mondiale (in French). Paris: Fayard. ISBN 978-2-213-02215-4.